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CHANGING THE PARADIGM OF STOCK OWNERSHIP FROM CONCENTRATED TOWARDS 
DISPERSED OWNERSHIP? 
EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL AND CONSEQUENCES FOR EMERGING COUNTRIES 
Érica Gorga 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes micro-level dynamics of changes in ownership structures.  It 
investigates a unique event: changes in ownership patterns currently taking place in Brazil.  It 
builds upon empirical evidence to advance theoretical understanding of how and why 
concentrated ownership structures can change towards dispersed ownership.   
Commentators argue that the Brazilian capital markets are finally taking off.  The 
number of listed companies and IPOs in the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) has greatly 
increased.  Firms are migrating to Bovespa’s special listing segments, which require higher 
standards of corporate governance.  Companies have sold control in the market, and the stock 
market has recently seen an attempted hostile takeover.  This paper discusses these current 
developments and analyzes ownership structures of companies listed on Bovespa’s listing 
segments based on data from 2006 and 2007.  It provides the first evidence of the decline of 
ownership concentration in Brazilian corporations. 
There is, however, an important caveat: dispersed ownership is mainly found in Novo 
Mercado, the listing segment that requires the one-share-one-vote rule.  This paper, then, 
investigates firms’ migration patterns, and finds that 85% of Novo Mercado’s are “new 
entrant” firms.  Traditional firms have mostly migrated to Level 1, the least stringent corporate 
governance segment.  Thus, there are two corporate worlds in Brazilian capital markets: new 
corporations that adopt proactive corporate governance patterns, and established corporations 
that retain their main patterns of corporate governance or ownership structure.   
This paper additionally explores the consequences of increased dispersion of ownership 
through private contracting, such as shareholders’ agreements and bylaws.  The evidence 
suggests an increasing reliance on shareholders’ agreements to coordinate joint control and to 
bind directors’ votes.  I also find a growing adoption of anti-takeover devices in bylaws. 
Finally, this paper sheds light on the incentives that may alter preferences of controlling 
shareholders.  This discussion also explains why controlling shareholders opt to create greater 
diversity of ownership structures.  This analysis advances our knowledge of corporate 
structures in other emerging countries. 
   
© 2008 Érica Gorga. All rights reserved.
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Corporate governance scholars have recently begun to analyze publicly held 
corporations that have controlling shareholders.1  Controlling shareholders are the most 
common distribution of corporate ownership outside of the United States and the United 
Kingdom.2  They are prevalent in continental Europe,3 and especially in developing 
countries in Asia4 and Latin America5.  
Scholars have attempted to explain the prevalence of large shareholders in these 
countries.6  An important body of literature has shown that the extraction of private 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1652 (2006) (surveying this literature); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 786 (2003); and Ronald J. Gilson, 
Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange __ (ECGI Law 
Working Paper Group, Paper No. 79, 2007). 
2
 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the 
World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 498 (1999) (“If we look at the largest firms in the world and use a very tough 
definition of control, dispersed ownership is about as common as family control.  But if we move from 
there to medium-sized firms, to a more lenient definition of control, and to countries with poor investor 
protection, widely held firms become an exception.  Berle and Means have created an accurate image of 
ownership of large American corporations, but it is far from a universal image.”). 
3
 See, e.g., Peter Högfeldt, The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in Sweden, in A HISTORY OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD __ (Randall Morck, ed. 2005); Alexander Aganin & Paolo 
Volpin, The History of Corporate Ownership in Italy, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND 
THE WORLD __ (Randall Morck, ed. 2005); and Marco Becht & Ekkehart Boehmer, Voting Control in 
German Corporations, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. __ (2003).  See also Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The 
Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365 (2002). (showing that family 
ownership is more common than widely held ownership in continental Europe); and MARCO BECHT, 
ARIANE CHAPELLE & LUE RENNEBOOK, SHAREHOLDERING CASCADES: THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP 
AND CONTROL IN BELGIUM IN OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE (F. Barca, M. Becht, 
ed. 2000). 
4
 See Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership and Control in 
East Asia Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 92-93 (2000) (demonstrating that more than two-thirds of 
public corporations in East Asia have controlling shareholders, most of whom represent family-owned 
companies). 
5
 See, e.g., Richard A. Price, Francisco J. Roman & Brian Robert Rountree, Governance Reform, Share 
Concentration and Financial Reporting Transparency in Mexico (April 7, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=897811.  See also La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 2, at __ 
(showing that  virtually all Mexican and Argentinian corporations are controlled by few wealthy families). 
6
 See, e.g., Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders, supra note 1, at __; and Stijn Claessens, Simeon 
Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan & Larry H.P. Lang, Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of 
Large Shareholders, 57 J. FIN. 2741 (2002) (finding that there are incentive and entrenchment effects of 
large share ownership.  The former refers to increases in firm value in connection with the cash-flow 
ownership of the largest shareholders, and the latter refers to decreases in firm value that occur when 
control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow ownership). 
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benefits of control is a key reason why these shareholders maintain corporate control.7  
Related works have proposed several hypotheses to explain why private benefits of 
control are large in certain countries and small in others.8 
Even though this literature has advanced our understanding of corporate 
governance structures, there remains a serious gap in our knowledge.  We still do not 
understand the dynamics of changes in patterns of ownership.  While we know why most 
corporate ownership is concentrated in the hands of controlling shareholders, we must 
investigate how concentrated ownership can transform into dispersed ownership or how 
ownership change operates in practice. 
This gap exists partially because ownership patterns do not change very quickly 
or often.  As Nobel Prize laureate Douglass North argued, institutional change is slow 
and path dependent in nature.9  However, there are examples we can look to. 
There are two countries where concentrated ownership has transformed into 
dispersed ownership: the United States and the United Kingdom.  Scholars have already 
debated the causes that led to such change.10  But this debate is advantaged and 
disadvantaged because these countries already consolidated their ownership change 
process before they became subject to scholarly inquiry.11   
One advantage is that it is certain that the US and the UK are species of the 
dispersed ownership genre.  They are success stories of corporate ownership change.12  
                                                 
7
 See, e.g., Lucian A Bebchuk, A rent-protection theory of corporate ownership and control __ (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper Group, Paper No. 7203, 1999), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7203. 
8
 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor 
Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A 
Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2151 (2001); and Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to 
Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000). 
9
 Douglass North, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).  See 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 
52. L. REV. 127 (1999) (elaborating the argument of path dependence in relation to corporate ownership 
structures). 
10
 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L. J. 76 (2001); and Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? 
The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 469 (2001). 
11
 Cheffins, supra note 10, at __ (noting that Berle and Means argued that dispersed ownership was the 
predominant type of ownership in the US in early 1930s).  
12
 See Marco Becht & J. Bradford Delong, Why Has There Been So Little Block Holding in America?, in A 
HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 613 (Randall Morck, ed. 2005) (commenting 
 5 
So the study of these cases bears a certainty that does not exist when one analyzes initial 
stages of ownership change which may be instable.  For example, researchers report that 
some countries, such as Canada, Germany and Japan, experienced temporary ownership 
dispersion that soon reverted to traditional concentrated ownership.13  In contrast, the 
United States and the United Kingdom have successfully surpassed the instability 
inherent to economic change and now present well-defined dispersed ownership patterns.  
Moreover, enough time has passed from the time both countries experienced initial 
changes in ownership structures to allow a more comprehensive investigation about the 
variables that may have brought about ownership change. 
On the other hand, there are disadvantages from using the United States and 
United Kingdom as ownership change benchmarks.  Because ownership change has 
already been consolidated, scholars cannot accurately assess which variables mattered 
most at the beginning of the process.  So, there are competing theories that attempt to 
explain what happened first: dispersion of ownership or investor protection.  La Porta et 
al. argue that formal laws protecting investors and proper enforcement are a precondition 
for pulverizing share ownership and developing capital markets.14  In contrast, Coffee and 
Cheffins contend that the development of capital markets occurred without such formal 
laws.15  Accordingly, we do not have a clear picture of the turning point that caused the 
change or development of each phase of the process.  Experiencing the change at the 
present moment offers the opportunity to accurately map out these phases and major 
events.  
  This paper aims at analyzing the micro-level dynamics of changes in ownership 
structures.  It investigates a unique, contemporaneous event.  This event refers to a 
                                                                                                                                                 
that America’s response to the Great Depression was to destroy family capitalism). 
13
 See, e.g., Randall K. Morck, Michael Percy, Gloria Y. Tian & Bernard Yeung, The Rise and Fall of the 
Widely Held Firm, in A History of Corporate Ownership in Canada, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 613 (Randall Morck, ed. 2005) (discussing the upheaval and decline of 
freestanding widely held firms in Canada); Caroline Fohlin, The History of Ownership and Control in 
Germany, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 613 (Randall Morck, ed. 
2005); and Randall K. Morck & Masao Nakamura, A Frog in a Well Knows Nothing of the Ocean.  A 
History of Corporate Ownership in Japan, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE 
WORLD 613 (Randall Morck, ed. 2005). 
14
 La Porta et. al., supra note 8, at 7.  
15
 Coffee, Jr., supra note 10, at 76; and Cheffins, supra note 10, at 469.  See also Julian Franks, Colin 
Mayer & Stefano Rossi, Spending Less Time With the Family.  The Decline of Family Ownership in the 
United Kingdom, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 613 (Randall Morck, 
ed. 2005)  
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process of change in patterns of ownership in Brazil, where corporations have historically 
been characterized by severely concentrated ownership.16 These concentrated ownership 
patterns have recently diluted, indicating an early stage of diffused ownership.17  Based 
on this evidence of ownership change, this paper contributes to the corporate governance 
literature by inquiring how and why ownership structures change.   
  This case study also adds to the literature on controlling shareholders.  Recent 
articles have called attention to the taxonomy of controlling shareholders types, 
proposing that the simple taxonomy distinguishing between countries with controlling 
shareholder systems and widely held shareholder systems is unrefined.18  According to 
this view, controlling shareholders structures are more nuanced: they can vary from 
efficient to inefficient structures with controlling shareholders who extract pecuniary or 
nonpecuniary private benefits of control.19   
Brazil is usually classified as a system with inefficient controlling shareholders 
receiving both pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits.20  Investigating recent conditions 
leading Brazilian concentrated ownership to become dispersed therefore illuminates the 
incentives that may alter the preferences of controlling shareholders.  Additionally, this 
discussion allows us to understand why controlling shareholders may opt for a greater 
diversity of ownership structures.  It then enable us to draw comparisons and make 
deductions that can enrich the comparative corporate governance debate and advance our 




                                                 
16
 See notes accompanying text infra Section IV. 
17
 See evidence infra Section V. 
18
 Gilson, Controlling Shareholders, supra note 1, at 1643. 
19
 Id. at 1652, 1661. 
20
 See Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59 J. 
FIN. 537, 539 (2004) (finding that private benefits of control are worth 65% of the equity value of a firm in 
Brazil); and Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-Country 
Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325 (2001) (noting that private benefits of control in Brazil are 16% to 23% of a 
company’s market value).  See generally Érica Gorga, Culture and Corporate Law Reform: A Case Study 
of Brazil, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L., 803 (2006) (discussing controlling shareholders in Brazil). 
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I.1.  A CASE STUDY OF CHANGE IN  OWNERSHIP PATTERNS 
 
Brazil traditionally had capital markets that could not sufficiently finance 
corporations because of high discounts applied to security prices.21  Brazilian firms were 
characterized by strong ownership concentration22 and weak corporate governance.23  
Family tycoons typically retained ownership of voting shares,24 and extracted very high 
private benefits from control of the corporations.25  Boards were comprised entirely or 
almost entirely of representatives of the controlling family or group or insiders.26 
Yet new developments in Brazilian capital markets seem to challenge the  
traditional model.  Firms have been looking for equity financing in the market.27  The 
number of listed companies in the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) has risen.28  
Firms are adhering to higher standards of corporate governance29 through migration to 
Bovespa’s special listing segments.30  The number of IPOs has increased tremendously.31  
                                                 
21
 See Maria Helena Santana, Case study on the Novo Mercado (NM) of Sao Paolo Stock Exchange 
(Bovespa) (2007), forthcoming in Focus series of Global Corporate Governance Forum, World Bank, at 8-9 
(arguing that discount in shares prices was considered the most important factor for a company’s lack of 
interest in the stock market); and Tatiana Nenova, Control Values and Changes in Corporate Law in 
Brazil__ (EFMA London Meetings, 2002), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=294064 (measuring price difference between 
controlling and non-controlling shares and finding that the market applies a discount to non-controlling 
shares).  See also David M. Trubek, Law, Planning, and the Development of the Brazilian Capital Market: 
A Study of Law in Economic Change 48-49 (Yale Law School Studies in Law and Modernization No. 3, 
April 1971), available at __ (discussing the failure of strategies that the government sought to adopt to deal 
with depressed stock prices in the early beginnings of private capital markets). 
22
 See infra Section IV and notes. 
23
 See generally Gorga, supra note 20 (discussing corporate governance failures in Brazil).  
24
 Id. (discussing family ownership in Brazil).  
25
 See generally Dyck & Zingales, supra note 20, and Nenova, supra note 20.  See also Rafael La Porta, 
Simeon Djankov, Florencio Lopez de Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing 
25 (NBER Working Paper Group, Paper No. W11883, Dec. 2005) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=875734 (stating that block premium is very high in Brazil, amounting to 49%). 
26
 See Bernard S. Black, Antonio Gledson de Carvalho & Érica Gorga, An Overview of Brazilian Corporate 
Governance, (U. of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper. Paper No. 109) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003059 (examining board corporate governance practices in Brazil). 
27
 See, e.g., Dinheiro mais barato para as empresas. Com anos de atraso, as companhias brasileiras 
começam a ter opção de financiamento fora dos bancos [Cheaper Finance for Firms. With a Delay of One 
Hundred Years, Brazilian Companies Start to Have Financing Alternatives Outside Banks], REVISTA 
EXAME, Apr. 25, 2005.  
28
 See infra Table 2. 
29
 See Table 2 infra Section II and Table 1.  
30
 See infra Table 7. 
31
 See infra Table 5. 
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The stock market has seen the first attempt of a hostile takeover in thirty years.32  
Companies have been selling control in the market,33 and anti takeover defenses are being 
incorporated into companies’ bylaws.34 In addition to these company-related 
developments, Bovespa recently merged with the Brazilian Exchange for Future 
Contracts and Commodities (“BM&F”) and became the world’s third largest stock 
exchange.35    
This phenomenon has received significant attention from the media.  Several 
articles have pointed out that the Brazilian capital market is experiencing unprecedented 
momentum.  They have specially focused on the so-called trend towards dispersed 
ownership.36  According to these commentators, Brazil is finally experiencing a transition 
in ownership patterns.  Some hypothesize that ownership diffusion may result in 
Brazilian managerial control becoming more like its American counterpart.37   
Scholars have not yet analyzed this phenomenon.  Nonetheless, these recent 
developments present a very interesting opportunity for research. If ownership patterns 
are indeed shifting, we need to understand how and why ownership structure is changing.   
                                                 
32
 Discussed infra Section V.1.   
33
 See, e.g., Dasa vai pulverizar o controle acionário em bolsa [Dasa Will Diffuse Stock Control in the 
Stock Exchange], VALOR ECONÔMICO, Jan. 25, 2006; Perdigão pulveriza capital e entra na onda das 
companhias públicas [Perdigão Diffuses Capital and Get into the Wave of Public Companies], VALOR 
ECONÔMICO, Jan. 17, 2006; and Empresas sem dono [Firms Without Owners]. REVISTA EXAME, Jan. 26, 
2006. 
34
 Vitamina ou veneno?  Enquanto a Europa discute os prós e contras das poison pills, o Brasil desenvolve 
versões próprias da pílula e reforça a dose quando o controle é pulverizado [Vitamin or poison?  While 
Europe Discusses the Pros and Cons of Poison Pills, Brazil Develops Its Own Pill Versions and Reinforces 
the Dose When Control Is Diffused], REVISTA CAPITAL ABERTO, Mar. 2006.  
35
 Heloiza Canassa & Edgar Ortega, Bovespa-BM&F Merger to Create Third-Biggest Exchange, 
Bloomberg, 03/26/3008 available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=abTHmx9GUGwA&refer=news. 
36
 See supra note 11; A vida depois da pulverização.  Empresas que já optaram pela diluição de controle 
têm aumento de liquidez em seus papéis e passam a fazer parte dos principais índices [Life After Diffusion 
of Shares.  Companies that Have Chosen Diffusion of Control Have Liquidity Increase for Their Securities 
and Become Part of the Main Index], VALOR ECONÔMICO, June 29, 2006; and Para Previ, pulverização de 
controle valoriza governança [For Previ, Control Pulverization Enhances Governance], VALOR 
ECONÔMICO, Jan. 18, 2006. 
37
 See Empresas sem dono [Firms Without Owners]. REVISTA EXAME, Jan. 26, 2006; and Controle 
pulverizado cria grupo de executivos superpoderosos. Modelo exige mais participação dos acionistas e 
atenção aos conflitos de interesse [Diffused Control Creates A Group of Super Powerful Executives.  The 
Model Requires More Shareholder Participation and Attention to Conflict of Interests], VALOR 
ECONÔMICO, Mar. 13, 2006. 
 9 
To investigate changes in Brazilian ownership structures, this paper analyzes data 
on ownership structure of Brazilian listed corporations using Annual Information Reports 
for the year 2006 and updated in 2007.  To determine whether concentrated ownership 
has been decreasing recently, I compare data obtained from this research with results of 
previous studies on ownership structures from 1996 to 200238.  I analyze emerging types 
of control structures in association with less concentration of ownership, inquiring 
whether firms present minority control or eventually managerial control.   
In addition to establishing whether ownership has become more dispersed, 
assessing whether shareholders have changed enables us to understand developments in 
corporate governance.  Do profiles of the largest stockholders look the same as they used 
to?  Has family ownership dissipated?  Has institutional investor ownership increased?  
To answer these questions, this paper identifies changes in the profiles of majority 
shareholders.  I compare this data with results obtained by previous studies and conclude 
that, differently than one may expect, no relevant change in the profile of shareholders 
has occurred.  Family ownership is still a dominant feature of Brazilian corporations, but 
there have been other significant developments in ownership structures.  For example, 
government ownership has considerably lessened and institutional investors ownership 
seems to be increasing.  
This paper finds that managerial control is far from being a Brazilian reality.  But 
this paper presents evidence that concentration of ownership has indeed diminished in 
Brazilian capital markets.  There is, however, one important caveat: ownership has 
become more “dispersed” in Novo Mercado, the special listing segment of Bovespa that 
requires that firms adopt the one-share-one-vote rule.  I find that the largest shareholder 
of Novo Mercado companies holds 36.39% of the shares on average.  This data greatly 
contrasts with measures of the largest stake of shares from previous studies.39   When we 
move from Novo Mercado to Level 2 and Level 1, segments with less stringent 
requirements of corporate governance, we find that ownership becomes increasingly 
more concentrated.  The average of the largest shareholder ownership is 64.79% and 
63.14% in Level 2 and Level 1, respectively.  
                                                 
38
 See references infra Section IV. 
39
 See notes infra Section IV. 
 10 
It may appear as though companies have been changing their governance and 
ownership patterns in the ways envisioned by Novo Mercado.40  However, this paper 
argues that this conclusion is, at best, incomplete.  For a complete understanding of these 
current changes, any account must analyze the players who have been changing corporate 
governance patterns.  
This paper analyzes the historical background of all the firms that have listed on 
Novo Mercado, Level 2 and Level 1.  I identify the companies that have migrated from 
Bovespa’s traditional listing market to a special segment (Novo Mercado, Level 2 or 
Level 1). One could suppose that firms have been scaling-up from the standard listing 
segment to Level 1, Level 2 and then to Novo Mercado to take advantage of the 
heightened value of their securities in most stringent segments.41  One could even assume  
that most firms that are listed now in Novo Mercado used to be listed on the traditional 
segment.  However, the reality is that few companies from the traditional listing market 
have migrated to Novo Mercado.  Only 15.2% of the firms listed on Novo Mercado come 
from the standard market.  The majority of companies (thirty-five out of fifty-seven or 
61.4%) that originally migrated from the standard market went to Level 1.42 
In contrast, the majority of companies that have been listing in Novo Mercado are 
mostly “new entrants.”  Nearly 85% of Novo Mercado’s firms are closely held 
                                                 
40
 See Affonso Celso Pastore, Síndrome de Peter Pan: argumentos adicionais [Peter Pan Syndrome: 
Additional Arguments], VALOR ONLINE, Sept. 10, 2007, available at 
http://www.valoreconomico.com.br/valoreconomico/285/primeirocaderno/opiniao/Sindrome+de+Peter+Pa
n+argumentos+adicionais,,,58,4522835.html?highlight=&newsid=4522835&areaid=58&editionid=1855; 
and Cristiano Romero, A decolagem do mercado de capitais [Taking off of the Capital Markets], VALOR 
ECONÔMICO, Jan. 3, 2007.  See also Temporada de compras [Buying Season], REVISTA EXAME, Nov. 16 
2006.  
41
 See Antonio Gledson de Carvalho & George G. Pennacchi, Can a Stock Exchange Improve Corporate 
Behavior? Evidence from Firm´s Migration to Premium Listings in Brazil __ (Jan. 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=678282.  See also Ricardo P.C. Leal & Andre Carvalhal-da-Silva, Corporate 
Governance and Value in Brazil (and in Chile) __ (Oct. 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=726261 (finding strong evidence that good corporate governance leads to a higher 
market valuation and lower cost of capital).  See generally Bernard S. Black, Inessa Love, & Andrei 
Rachinsky, Corporate Governance and Firms' Market Values: Time Series Evidence from Russia, 7 
EMERGING MARKETS REVIEW 361-79 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=866988 (finding that 
governance predicts market value in a firm fixed effects framework in Russia); Bernard S. Black & 
Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Can Corporate Governance Reforms Increase Firms' Market Values?  Evidence 
from India, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=914440 (noting that 
investors consider Clause 49’s corporate governance reforms in India valuable, as large firms’ share prices 
react positively to reform announcements).  
42
 See infra Section II and Table 1. 
 11 
corporations that have gone public and issued shares directly in this listing segment.  This 
suggests that we can identify two corporate worlds in Brazilian capital markets.  One 
world consists of new corporations which adopt better corporate governance patterns; the 
other, traditional corporations which have not changed their main patterns of corporate 
governance or ownership.  So, while new entrants increase corporate governance quality 
and market competition, a significant group of corporations resist changes and act as path 
dependence theory would predict.43  
The new entrants are, on their own, changing the market as more dispersed 
ownership patterns produce important consequences in corporate control and governance.  
This paper, accordingly, discusses the consequences of this phenomenon on Brazilian 
corporate governance and legal regulations.   
One by-product of dispersed ownership is minority control, which is posing new 
issues for the management of corporations.  In response, Brazilian companies have begun 
relying heavily on shareholder agreements.  Main shareholders use these agreements to 
coordinate corporate decision-making and exercise of control.  My goal is to identify the 
effects that shareholders agreements produce on corporate control.  I survey shareholders’ 
agreements of all firms with dispersed control disclosed in 2006-2007 Annual 
Information Reports (IANs) to Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios (CVM)–the Brazilian 
Securities Exchange Commission.  This is the first work I am aware of to assess how 
shareholders’ agreements interfere in corporate governance.  Corporate governance 
scholars usually restrict their analyses to companies’ charters and bylaws.  Analysis of 
shareholders’ agreements in Brazil reveals that the contractual relations that affect 
corporate governance may be more complex than generally assumed.  Thus, this article 
contributes to corporate governance literature by showing that shareholders’ agreements 
are a very important piece of the governance puzzle that researchers try to figure out. 
A second development refers to changes in companies’ bylaws.  Many 
corporations are adopting legal mechanisms to prevent hostile takeovers.  Renner and 
Perdigao were the first companies to include anti-takeover in their bylaws.44  I investigate 
                                                 
43
 Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 9, at 137-38. 
44
 See Adversários de primeira viagem.  Oferta hostil da Sadia pelo controle da Perdigão deixa espaço 
para os administradores brasileiros agirem com muito mais governança da próxima vez [First Trip 
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eighty-four companies without a clear controlling shareholder to assess how diluted 
ownership has led to the use of anti-takeover clauses in bylaws.  
  After analyzing how ownership patterns have been changing and the 
consequences of this process, this paper discusses why this change has taken place.  This 
paper then considers the Brazilian experience to suggest how dispersed ownership has 
been promoted and how the law, the State, and private players supported this 
development.  I then build on empirical evidence from Brazil to advance theoretical 
understanding of changes in corporate ownership structures in emerging countries.  In 
addition, I highlight several problems regulators will face in strengthening Brazilian 
capital markets. 
  This paper proceeds as follows.  In Section II, I identify recent changes in the 
Brazilian market following the creation of Bovespa’s listing segments.  I show a 
consistent increase in the number of IPOs and the numbers of the new listing 
phenomenon.  In Section III, I analyze what companies have migrated to Novo Mercado, 
Level 2, and Level 1.  In Section IV, I review empirical evidence of ownership 
concentration in the Brazilian capital markets.  In Section V, I discuss the recent takeover 
attempt and present new data on the decrease of ownership concentration.  I examine 
patterns of ownership in Bovespa’s corporate governance segments and find that 
dispersed ownership is present in Novo Mercado and not in Level 2 and Level 1.  Section 
VI then explores the main consequences of increased dispersion of ownership on private 
contracting.  Section VII matches empirical evidence with theoretical hypotheses on 
changes of corporate ownership and highlights lessons we can learn from the Brazilian 
experience.  It identifies the reasons for and consequences of ownership change on other 
emerging markets.  Section VIII discusses challenges that Brazilian regulation will have 




                                                                                                                                                 
Adversaries; and Sadia’s Hostile Offer for Perdigao’s Control Leaves Room For Brazilian Managers to Act 
with More Governance Next Time], REVISTA CAPITAL ABERTO, Aug. 2006. 
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II. RECENT MARKET DEVELOPMENTS: SPECIAL LISTING SEGMENTS, LISTING 
EVOLUTION AND IPOS 
 
Bovespa, the main stock exchange in Brazil, launched three special listing 
segments in December of 2000: Level 1, Level 2 and Novo Mercado.  These segments 
were intended to enhance companies’ securities prices and attract investors to the market 
by fostering transparency and confidence in the stock market.  To list in these segments, 
companies must comply with disclosure requirements and corporate governance practices 
stricter than those required by Brazilian legislation.  Because the standard trading market 
continues to exist, firms voluntarily choose to migrate to the special segments.   
Table 1 details the most important rules of the special listing segments.  Level 1 
basically requires: 1) a maintenance of free-float of at least 25% of the total capital, 2) 
improvements in quarterly information reports, including disclosure of consolidated 
financial statements, cash flow statement, and special audit revision, 3) disclosure of an 
annual calendar of corporate events, 4) disclosure of trading involving securities of the 
company by its management or controlling shareholder, and 5) disclosure of contracts 
between the company and related-parties. 
Level 2 mandates compliance with Level 1’s rules and the following regulations: 
1) disclosure of financial statements in accordance with US GAAP or IFRS standards, 2) 
a unified term of two years at maximum for the entire board of the directors, which must 
be comprised by at least five members, from which 20% must be independent, 3) voting 
rights granted to non-voting (preferred) shares in certain corporate decisions such as 
merger, spin-off, or incorporation, approval of contracts between the company and other 
firms of the same holding group when deliberation occurs at the general meeting, 4) tag 
along rights for non-voting shareholders who ought to receive at least 80% of the price 
paid for the voting shares of the controlling shareholder in a sale of control, 5) obligation 
to hold a tender offer by the economic value of the shares in case of delisting or going-
private transaction, and 6) adherence to the Market Arbitration Panel for the solution of 
corporate disputes. 
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Novo Mercado requires compliance with Level 1’s and Level 2’s standards and 
the following rules: 1) all shares must be voting shares, and 2) tag along rights for all 
minority shareholders who must receive the same price paid for the shares of the 
controlling shareholder.  
All three segments require that public share offerings use mechanisms favoring 
capital dispersion and broader retail access.  While this rule can be interpreted in very 
different ways,45 it is clear that the one-share-one-vote rule best enables ownership to 
become dispersed.  This rule is only required by Novo Mercado.  Therefore, Novo 
Mercado is the most stringent listing segment, followed by Level 2 and Level 1, the least 
stringent segment. 
  Table 2 displays information on listing evolution in Bovespa’s segments.  In the 
first three years of existence, the market did not respond as expected.   By the end of 
2003, there were only two companies listed on Novo Mercado and three companies listed 
on Level 2.  Level 1 already had thirty-one companies, but no clear pattern emerged 
because Level 1 was not considered to require a great change in corporate governance 
standards.  Then, slowly in 2004, the situation began to change.  The boom came in 2006.  
At the end of this year, there were forty-four companies listed on Novo Mercado and 
fourteen on Level 2.  Interestingly, Level 1 did not share the same growth rate.  By the 
end of 2006, Level 1 listed thirty-seven companies, a slight increase from 2003.  The 
Novo Mercado’s boom continued through the end of 2007 and the adhesion rate more 
than doubled during this period, making a total of ninety-two listed companies.  Level 2 
did not benefit from the same evolution and grouped twenty companies for the same time 
frame.  Level 1 also obtained just few more companies, forty-four in all.  
  Novo Mercado’s firms have been responsible for the large growth in the number 
of IPOs in Bovespa.  Table 5 presents the numbers of the IPO phenomenon for primary 
offerings, secondary offerings and mixed offerings.  I focus on the numbers of primary 
and mixed offerings (these also include a primary initial public offering).  In 2004, only 
three companies engaged in IPOs in Novo Mercado and two companies in Level 2.  In 
                                                 
45
 The specific criteria required by Bovespa to meet this rule are: (i) ensured access to all interested 
investors and (ii) allocation of at least 10% of the total distribution to individuals or non-institutional 
investors.  (See Rule 7.1 of Level 1, Level 2, and Novo Mercado.) 
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2005, five companies in Novo Mercado and two companies in Level 2 went public.  The 
number of IPOs dramatically increased in 2006 and 2007.  In 2006, seventeen IPOs were 
conducted in Novo Mercado and four in Level 2.  In 2007, the numbers jumped to forty-
one IPOs in Novo Mercado, seven in Level 2, and eight in Level 1.  
Table 6 shows that Novo Mercado has been receiving the vast majority of the 
new IPOs.  Novo Mercado already represents 18.59% of the market capitalization of 
Bovespa.  Level 2 does much worse than this score.  Nonetheless, the largest market 
capitalization of the new listing segments comes from Level 1, which makes 
approximately 38%, more than two times the market capitalization of Novo Mercado.  
Overall, the largest capitalization of Bovespa still comes from the standard market, 
which accounts for little more market capitalization than Level 1, accounting for 
approximately 40% of the total market capitalization of the stock exchange.   
Analyzing this data, we can foresee that Level 1 will surpass the standard market 
in terms of market capitalization.  However, this is less likely to happen with Novo 
Mercado, if most traditional Brazilian firms continue to adhere to Level 1. 
 
III. THE COMPANIES LISTED ON BOVESPA’S NOVO MERCADO, LEVEL 2 AND LEVEL 1, 
AND THEIR MIGRATION PATTERNS 
 
 
By the end of 2007, Bovespa had 156 companies listed on its special segments of 
corporate governance (ninety-two in Novo Mercado, twenty in Level 2 and forty-four in 
Level 1).46  These numbers present a notable development considering the historical 
evolution of Brazilian capital markets.  As a result, many commentators are very 
optimistic about the recent growth of the market. 
These developments can imply several hypotheses about stock market and 
corporate governance evolution.  Recent studies show that Novo Mercado’s firms receive 
                                                 
46
 Based on data gathered by the end of 2007. 
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higher prices for their securities.47  These prices should encourage firms to upgrade their 
listing level, since firms can more easily obtain financing by enacting stricter corporate 
governance practices.  Therefore, one could suppose that firms that used to be listed on 
the standard market should gradually scale-up from this market to Level 1, Level 2, and 
then to Novo Mercado.  One could hypothesize that the majority of firms that are listed 
now in Novo Mercado came from the traditional segment.  However, a careful analysis of 
which companies have been listing on Novo Mercado does not support these hypotheses.  
In this Section, I identify the companies listed on Novo Mercado and the dates 
when their shares began to be traded in this segment.  Then, I inquire whether these 
companies had been previously listed on the Bovespa standard market, Level 2 or Level 
1.  For this purpose, I checked the dates of their registration with CVM, to assess when 
these companies opened their capital and whether they had done so in Bovespa’s standard 
market.  Phone calls have been conducted to clarify doubts when the data was found 
insufficient to determine whether the company had been listed on the standard market. 
To date, Bovespa has ninety-two companies listed on Novo Mercado.48  Table 7 
shows that, of these companies, only fifteen companies, or approximately 16.3% of all 
Novo Mercado’s companies, migrated from the traditional market.  These companies 
include: Banco Brasil SA, Cia Hering, Cia Saneamento Basico Est Sao Paulo, CPFL 
Energia SA, Drogasil SA, Eternit SA, Gafisa SA, Industrias Romi SA, Light SA, Lojas 
Renner SA, Perdigao SA, Rossi Residencial SA, Sao Carlos Empreendimentos e 
Participacoes SA, Tractebel Energia SA and Weg S.A.  Therefore, the vast majority of 
Novo Mercado companies are new entrants that have listed their IPOs in Novo Mercado. 
There are twenty companies listed on Level 2.  From these companies, eight 
firms (40%) have already been listed on the traditional market.  These include All 
América Latina Logística SA, Centrais Eletricas de Santa Catarina SA, Eletropaulo 
Metrop. Elet. Sao Paulo SA, Marcopolo SA, Net Sevicos de Comunicação SA, Saraiva 
                                                 
47
 See, e.g., Alexandre Di Miceli da Silveira & Lucas Ayres B. de C. Barros, Corporate Governance 
Quality and Firm Value in Brazil __ (June 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=923310; and 
Antonio Gledson de Carvalho & George G. Pennacchi, Can Voluntary Market Reforms Promote Efficient 
Corporate Governance?  Evidence from Firms' Migration to Premium Markets in Brazil __ (Jan. 25, 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=678282. 
48Based on data collected at the end of 2007. 
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SA Livreiros Editores, Suzano Petroquímica SA and Tam SA.  This information shows 
that although the majority of firms listed on Level 2 are new entrants in the stock 
exchange, a significant number of firms have migrated from the standard market. 
Bovespa has now forty-four companies listed on Level 1.  Thirty-five of these 
companies, or approximately 80% of all companies listed on Level 1, come from 
Bovespa’s traditional listing market.  These include: Aracruz Celulose SA, Bco Bradesco 
SA, Bco Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, Banco Itau Holding Finaceira SA, 
Parapanapanema SA, Brasil Telecom Participacoes SA, Brasil Telecom SA, Braskem 
SA, Centrais Elet Bras SA Eletrobras, Cia Energetica de Sao Paulo (CESP), Cia 
Brasileira de Distribuicao, Cia Energetica de Minas Gerais (CEMIG), Cia Fiacao Tecidos 
Cedro Cachoeira, Cia Transmissao Energia Elet Paulista, Cia Vale do Rio Doce, Confab 
Industrial SA, Duratex SA, Fras-Le SA, Gerdau SA, Iochpe Maxion SA, Itausa 
Investimentos Itau SA, Klabin SA, Mangels Industrial SA, Metalurgica Gerdau SA, 
Randon SA Implementos e Participacoes, SA Fabrica de Prods Alimenticios Vigor, Sadia 
SA, Sao Paulo Alpargatas SA, Suzano Papel e Celulose SA, Ultrapar Participacoes SA, 
Unibanco Holdings SA, Unibanco Uniao de Bcos Brasileiros SA, Unipar Uniao de Ind 
Petroq SA, Usinas Sid de Minas Gerais SA (USIMINAS), and Votorantim Celulose e 
Papel SA.  Traditional firms are more likely to gravitate towards segments that require 
small changes in corporate governance.   
Several factors explain the migration patterns of firms from the standard market 
to Level 1.  First, these firms tend to be large, established, and successful corporations.  
They can rely on internal or governmental financing or on financing from other 
institutions with which they have continuous businesses.  Therefore, they can resolve 
capital shortage without depending on the capital market.  Second, the controlling 
shareholders of these corporations are the wealthiest families in Brazil and they carry 
political influence.  Therefore, extracting non-pecuniary, and perhaps pecuniary, private 
benefits of control may be an important reason why they maintain control.  Third, Novo 
Mercado and Level 2 lessen corporate control because their additional disclosure 
requirements and, for Novo Mercado companies, the one-share-one-vote rule.  
Complying with these rules may conflict with the interests of important controlling 
shareholders.  Thus, consistent with path dependence hypothesis, we find that, traditional 
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firms that migrate most likely list on Level 1, which requires the least stringent changes 
in their initial ownership and governance structure. 
At this point, there is insufficient data to suggest that traditional market firms are 
gradually migrating to Level 1, to Level 2, and then to Novo Mercado.  Only four 
companies improved their corporate governance using this kind of step-by-step approach.  
Eternit SA went from the traditional market to Level 2 and then to Novo Mercado.  Cia 
Hering, Perdigao SA and Weg SA left the traditional market for Level 1 and then for 
Novo Mercado.  Two other companies, Net Servicos de Comunicao and Rossi 
Residencial SA, had their IPOs in Level 1 before migrating to Novo Mercado. 
In toto, the listing and migration patterns support three conclusions.  First, new 
entrants comprise the vast majority of Novo Mercado firms.  They likely utilize capital 
markets as an alternative for raising capital.  Therefore, they are the largely responsible 
for the growth in Bovespa’s IPOs market.   
Second, Level 2 represents the compromise between the strongest corporate 
governance practices of Novo Mercado and the weakest of Level 1. I believe that 
precisely because of this gray compliance with better corporate governance, Level 2 is 
the segment that has attracted the smallest number of listings.  Level 2 mostly contains 
new entrants, but it has a significantly greater percentage of firms from the standard 
market.  All companies listed on Level 2 have non-voting preferred shares in their 
structures, which explains why they have not listed on Novo Mercado.  Some of Level 
2’s companies suffer from regulatory restrictions due to the type of industry in which 
they operate.  This happens, for instance, with companies in the business of air 
transportation and education.  Such regulation constrains the possibility of converting 
non-voting shares into voting shares, therefore impeding companies from complying with 
Novo Mercado’s one share-one vote rule.49 
                                                 
49
 These are the cases of Anhanguera Educacional Participacoes S.A., Estacio Participacoes S.A., Kroton 
Educacional S.A., and SEB – Sistema Educional Brasileiro S.A.  Air transportation firms, according to Law 
7565/86, art 181 II must have four-fifths of the voting capital pertaining to Brazilian citzens.  In addition, 
article 181 §1º requires that firms’ bylaws prohibit the conversion of preferred non-voting shares into 
voting shares.  In the case of companies that provide educational services, a law still pending in Congress 
has constrained the ownership structure ex-ante the IPO period.  Article 7 of Project of Law No. XX 
mandates that 70% of the voting capital of any institution that sponsors universities should belong to 
Brazilian citzens.  Educational firms that recently went public arranged their ownership structure 
accordingly, issuing units, which are comprised of non-voting shares and voting shares. 
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Third, Level 1 is the segment that contains the largest number of firms that 
migrated from the standard market.  Level 1 contains very traditional Brazilian firms with 
very strong reputations.  These firms account for the largest market capitalization of the 
special segments.  Controlling shareholders have chosen to comply with weak corporate 
governance practices that permit them to continue to extract pecuniary and non pecuniary 
private benefits of control.  These firms have additional financing sources due to their 
strong political connections and reputations.  Path dependence also explains why most 
migrating traditional firms enter the segment that requires the least demanding changes in 
corporate governance, enabling them to preserve most of their initial ownership and 
governance structures. 
 
IV. CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP PATTERNS 
 
 Several studies have shown concentrated ownership characterizes Brazilian 
publicly-held companies.  For example, Valadares and Leal found that, on average, one 
shareholder owned 74% of the voting capital in 203 companies, or 62.5% of their 
sample.50  They relied on data disclosed in the 1996 IANs.  Their sample comprised 
ownership information on 325 companies, including twenty-six financial institutions.51   
Among 122 companies whose control is not retained by one sole shareholder, the largest 
shareholder owns, on average, 32% of the voting capital.  Therefore, a shareholder will 
retain a major voting block of shares even in companies without a controlling shareholder.  
Considering the entire sample, the largest shareholder owns, on average, 58% of the 
voting capital, the three largest shareholders own 78%, and the five largest own 82%.  
Only thirty-five companies, or 11% of the sample, have not issued non-voting shares.  
Valadares and Leal find that the total capital of companies is composed, on average, by 
54% voting shares and 46% non-voting shares.  So, non-voting shares have been used as a 
                                                 
50
 Sílvia Mourthé Valadares & Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal, Ownership and control structure of Brazilian 
companies 8 (2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=213409. 
51
 Id. at ___. 
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mechanism to separate ownership from control.52  
Confirming these findings, Carvalhal-da-Silva and Leal’s study on a sample of 
225 companies based on the IANs of 2000 showed that 90% of the sample had a 
shareholder owning more than 50% of the voting shares.  This shareholder retained, on 
average, 76% of the voting capital and 54% of the total capital of the firm.  Twenty-two 
companies did not have a controlling shareholder, and the largest shareholder held, on 
average, 37% of the voting capital.  On average, taking the entire sample into 
consideration, the largest shareholder owns 72% of the voting capital, the three and the 
five largest shareholders own 85% and 87% of the voting rights respectively.53  Thus, the 
total capital of the companies is composed, on average, by 53% of voting shares and 47% 
of non-voting shares.54 
Considering capital origin, Carvalhal-da-Silva and Leal observed that, of the 203 
companies which had a sole controlling shareholder, one hundred eight companies (48% 
of the sample) are controlled by families, sixty companies (27%) are controlled by 
foreign investors, nineteen (8%) by institutional investors, and sixteen (7%) by the 
government.55  
Aldrighi and Oliveira analyzed ownership and control concentration, relying on 
IANS dated between 1997 to 2002.56  They show that 77.3 % of listed companies have a 
                                                 
52
 Id. at 10 (“[I]f there is some diffusion in ownership of the firm, this occurs through non-voting shares. 
Thus small shareholders normally do not have voting rights, and therefore lack the formal power to 
guarantee their rights from company managers.”) 
53
 André Carvalhal-da-Silva & Ricardo Leal, Corporate governance, market valuation and dividend policy 
in Brazil 7 (Coppead Working Paper Series, Paper No. 390, Nov. 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=477302.  See also Eduardo Schiehll & Igor Oliveira dos Santos, Ownership 
structure of boards of directors: Evidence on Brazilian publicly-traded companies, Revista de 
Administração, São Paulo, vol. 39, n. 4, out.dez./ 2004, p. 381 (analyzing data from 2002 and concluding 
that “[o]verall, these statistics document that the ownership structure of Brazilian public firms has not 
changed significantly since 1998 and remains highly concentrated.”).    
54
 Carvalhal-da-Silva & Leal, supra note 53, at 9. 
55
 Id. at 8, 10-13.  The authors support their hypothesis that a higher concentration of voting rights is 
associated with a lower firm valuation, that the higher the voting total capital ratio, the lower is the firm 
valuation, that firms with a high concentration of voting rights have a low payout, and that firms with a 
high separation between voting and cash flow rights have a low payout. 
56
 Dante Mendes Aldrighi & Alessandro Vinícius Marques de Oliveira, The Influence of Ownership and 
Control Structures on the Firm Performance: Evidence from Brazil __ (Mar. 15, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=972615 (also finding evidence on minority expropriation by controlling 
shareholders, mainly in the case of  pyramids and non-voting shares structures which are associated with 
negative impacts on the performance of the largest firms). 
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controlling shareholder.  Of those companies, 31.8% have a controlling shareholder 
owning more than 90% of the firm’s voting capital.  The largest ultimate shareholder 
retains, on average, 70.7% of the voting rights of listed companies and 46.4% of the cash-
flows rights.  The discrepancy between voting rights and cash flows matches 24.3 
percentage points.  The largest ultimate shareholder owns more than 50% of the 
outstanding capital in 41.8% of the companies listed on Bovespa.  In 29.2% of the 
companies the largest ultimate shareholder holds cash-flow rights below 25%.   
In a recent study, Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva discovered a very high 
concentration of voting rights leveraged by the use of indirect control structures and non-
voting shares.57  They studied ownership structures using IANs from approximately 250 
firms in 1998, 2000 and 2002.  They concluded that ownership of voting rights became 
more concentrated during this period.58  They noted that controlling shareholders own 
more than 50% of the voting shares in 75% of the companies.59   
Thus, with respect to direct ownership, the largest shareholder has a median of 
71% of the voting rights and 50% of the cash-flow rights.  When indirect ownership is 
analyzed, the largest shareholder has 68% of the voting rights and 34% of the cash flow 
rights.60  These results demonstrate that the use of indirect control structures and non-
voting shares contribute to separation of ownership and control.61   
Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva also studied the identities of ultimate shareholders.  
Their data for 2002 showed that 75.2% of the firms have indirect control structures and 
21.5% of the companies have shareholders’ agreements among their largest shareholders.  
After considering indirect control structures and terms of shareholders’ agreements, they 
determined that 58.2% of the firms are ultimately owned by families, 24.9% by foreign 
investors (individuals or entities), 8.9% institutional investors (insurance companies, 
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 Leal & Carvalhal-da-Silva, supra note 41, at __. 
58
 Id. at 7. 
59
 Id. at 19. 
60
 Id. at __.  It is important to note that the authors have already adjusted ownership concentration results to 
reflect the voting blocks organized by means of shareholders’ agreements.  See id. at 20 (making ownership 
structures look much more concentrated than they actually are).  I analyze ownership structures both with 
and without taking shareholders’ agreements into account to compare the effects these agreements have on 
ownership concentration and control in the market. 
61
 Id. at 20. 
 22 
pension funds, foundations or investment funds), and 8% by the government.62 
Voting shares typically represented around 46.3% of the total number of shares in 
the market.  Forty-nine percent of all shares available for trading in the market, including 
voting and non-voting shares, were free-floating shares.  Non-voting shares used to be the 
most liquid, representing about 90% of trading volume at the Bovespa Stock Exchange.63 
Thus, the available studies on Brazilian ownership structures conclude that an 
overwhelming majority of companies are controlled by a sole shareholder with 
concentrated ownership of voting shares. 
 
V. TOWARDS DISPERSED OWNERSHIP? 
 
 
This Section analyzes whether and to what extent ownership structures are becoming 
more dispersed in Brazil.  I begin with anecdotal evidence of Sadia S.A.’s attempted 
takeover of Perdigao S.A.’s control.  This case drew enormous media attention as it was 
considered the first recent hostile takeover attempt in Brazilian capital markets.64   It 
provided the first evidence of three interesting developments in corporate control and 
governance structures: a) Perdigao’s significant dispersion of ownership by Brazilian 
standards; b) its main shareholders’ adoption of a shareholders’ agreement to coordinate 
control; and c) the current discussion on the adoption of tactical anti-takeover defenses. 
 
V.1.  THE RECENT TAKEOVER ATTEMPT 
 
Sadia S.A. and Perdigão S.A. are the largest players in the Brazilian food 
manufacturing business.  They produce meat, chicken, pork, turkey and meat derivatives, 
and process chilled frozen food such as pastas, poultry and vegetables.  They are both 
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 Id. at 20, 62. 
63
 Id. at __. 
64See Por que o negócio do ano não saiu [Why the Deal of the Year Did Not Go Through], REVISTA 
EXAME, July 28, 2006 (stating that the Brazilian market has seen two other successful takeovers: the offer 
of Companhia de Eletricidade de Juiz de Fora to acquire CEMIG in the 1970s and the takeover of Cimento 
Aratu by Votorantim in the 1980s).  
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importers and exporters of meat-based products.  Sadia is listed on Bovespa’s Level 1.  
Perdigão is listed on Novo Mercado. 
In June 2006, Sadia attempted to expand its international business by taking over 
Perdigão.  Sadia offered to pay $27.88 per share.65  Sadia’s price was the average market 
price of Perdigão’s shares at Bovespa in the 30 preceding days plus a premium of 35%.66  
Perdigão’s executives found Sadia’s price too far below Perdigão’s value and 
shareholders’ expectations.  Perdigão’s board additionally believed that the offer did not 
comply with procedures provided by Perdigão’s bylaws.67   
The largest shareholders of Perdigão are eight pension funds: Previ, Petrus, Fapes, 
Sistel, Valia, Real Grandeza Fundos de Previdência, Previ Banerj and PSPP.  Most of 
these funds engaged in a shareholders’ agreement regulating voting rights in the 
company.68  They jointly own about 49% of Perdigão’s voting shares.69  The pension 
funds designed a strategy to prevent the transaction by convincing Weg SA, a shareholder 
owning approximately 5.88% of Perdigão’s shares, not to tender its shares.  Because the 
pension funds controlled a very high percentage of shares, they simply adopted the 
strategy of saying “no.”70  
Sadia then offered a new price of $29 per share71.  This price was considered 
below the legal requirement that a second offer be priced at least 5% higher than the first 
offer72.  Grouping 55.38% of Perdigão’s capital, the funds refused to tender their shares 
and easily and quickly blocked the hostile takeover attempt.73 
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Many Brazilian companies are currently facing situations like Sadia’s hostile 
takeover attempt.  In 2006, Perdigão’s ownership structure was the following: Previ 
(15.6%), Petrus (11.9%), Sistel (5.1%), Weg Participacoes e Servicos SA (5.1%), Valia 
(4.1%), Fapes (3.6%), Real Grandeza Fundo de Previdencia (2.85), Fund. Inv. Tit e 
Valores Mobiliarios Librium (2.2%), and Previ Banerj (1.2%).74  Considering share 
ownership alone, no shareholder held a majority of the voting shares to control corporate 
decisions in the general meeting or to elect the majority of the board.  Though Previ and 
Petrus are the largest two shareholders, other shareholders could still challenge their 
power by acting as a homogeneous group.   
Many minority shareholders have been coping with this situation through 
shareholders’ agreements.  This was indeed the case of Perdigão, whose shareholders 
(Previ, Petrus, Sistel, Fapes, Real Grandeza, Previ Banerj and Valia) are bound by a 
shareholders’ agreement that regulates the exercise of voting rights.   
The control structure of Perdigao is highly concentrated because the effect of the 
shareholders’ agreement, which enables its management to form a quick defense.  
However, Perdigao’s ownership structure is sufficiently dispersed to make it a target for a 
hostile acquirer.  This situation is very unusual in Brazil and provides evidence of 
ownership change.   
The Sadia Perdigao case raises two hypotheses for this study: i) corporate control 
has become more dispersed among some shareholders; ii) shareholders’s agreements will 
be prevalent in firms with dispersed ownership, so that main shareholders can coordinate 
control.  Analyzing a larger sample of Brazilian companies may show whether a new 
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 25 
V.2. DATA ON SHARE OWNERSHIP 
 
The initial sample consists of the 530 firms listed on Bovespa at the end of 
2007.75  The following corporations were excluded: 1) corporations listed on the over the 
counter market (ninety-one firms); 2) corporations which have not issued equity (twenty-
four firms); 3) corporations that did not pass a “liquidity test,” and did not have any 
trading activity between January 1st and May 31st, 2007 (thirty-eight firms); and, 4) 
corporations with incomplete or unavailable data (thirty-eight firms).   
The final sample consists of 339 corporations, including all the companies listed 
on Novo Mercado (ninety-two companies), Level 2 (twenty companies) and Level 1 
(forty-four companies) and 183 companies from the standard market.  I collected 
information on shareholding structures from IANs delivered to CVM in 2007, referring to 
year-end 2006.   
IANs must be delivered annually, five months after the end of the company’s 
social exercise.  They must disclose information regarding the preceding year.76  Any 
changes in material facts which occur after the IAN’s delivery must be updated and 
resubmitted to CVM, including changes in shareholding ownership.77  Ninety-six 
companies reported changes in ownership structures during 2007 and resubmitted 
ownership disclosure information to CVM.  Accordingly, our data tracks these changes 
and includes up-to-date information delivered to CVM by the end of 2007.  IANs are 
publicly available from CVM’s and Bovespa’s websites.  
Additionally, CVM requires that shareholders disclose direct or indirect 
shareholding ownership corresponding to 5% or more of shares of a corporation.78  These 
data enabled me to identify shareholders composition, directly and indirectly.    
Moreover, I have found that the average ownership of the first, third, and fifth largest 
shareholders for each segment of Bovespa.79   
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I split the sample in two groups: firms with a controlling shareholder and firms 
without a controlling shareholder.  Control can be exercised through different 
mechanisms.  The most obvious, of course, is ownership of a relevant amount of shares.80  
For the purposes of this paper, a company is considered to have a controlling shareholder 
when a single shareholder (or a block of shareholders bound by shareholders’ 
agreements) owns more than 50% of the voting shares of the company.  A company will 
be classified as without a controlling shareholder if the largest shareholder has less than 
50% of the voting stock.  Therefore I distinguish between companies with a clear 
controlling shareholder and companies without a controlling shareholder.81  A controlling 
shareholder by this definition has uncontestable decision-making power in corporate 
affairs.  He or she may elect the majority of the board of directors (and managers) and 
control the agenda of the general shareholders’ meeting.  When ownership decreases 
below the 50% threshold, the power of one shareholder will depend on the ownership 
structure of the other shareholders.  This holds true even as ownership of voting shares 
declines.   
On the other hand, if ownership is considerably diffused (imagine a couple of 
shareholders owning around 5% of the voting capital), shareholders could coordinate 
control by using a non-ownership mechanism, such as contractual devices.  For example, 
shareholders’ agreements can guarantee control.  This would occur if shareholders 
owning less than 50% of the voting rights engage in a shareholders’ agreement to 
regulate their voting rights and/or exercise of control.82  Therefore, shareholders’ 
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My objective is to show that ownership patterns are changing in Brazil, and for this purpose I compare the 
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agreements are powerful mechanisms to assure control without requiring the burdensome 
financial commitment of having a lot of non-diversified capital invested in a corporation.  
In order to evaluate the role of shareholders’ agreements in bringing about 
control structures, I present the data before considering the terms of shareholders’ 
agreements.  
The data on direct ownership confirm that dispersion is found mostly in Novo 
Mercado, where the one-share-one-vote requirement promotes a broader diffusion of 
voting rights.  As reported in Table 8, the majority of firms (sixty-five out of ninety-two) 
listed on Novo Mercado lack a controlling shareholder.  In those sixty-five firms, the 
largest shareholder owns, on average, 26.23% of the shares, the three largest shareholders 
own 47.28% of the shares and the five largest own 54.73% of the shares.  These results 
show two or three largest shareholders can coordinate their voting rights and control a 
corporation, even when the largest shareholder alone cannot.  If those two or the three 
largest shareholders belong to the same family, this formal agreement may not even be 
necessary.  In the twenty-seven firms with a controlling shareholder, the largest 
shareholder on average owns 60.87% of the shares of the company. 
One could still argue that these numbers denote that concentrated ownership is 
still prevalent, especially if we accept a 20% threshold to assess control.83  However, 
these numbers are greatly contrast with the usual Brazilian pattern of ownership 
concentration reported in the previous section.  Considering the entire sample of firms 
listed on Novo Mercado (ninety-two), the largest shareholder owns 36.39% of the shares.  
These data confirm that Novo Mercado achieves considerably dispersed ownership in 
comparison to ownership concentration found in earlier studies.84 
Level 2 continues to be characterized by the traditional degree of ownership 
concentration.  In the sample of twenty companies listed on Level 2, the largest 
                                                 
83
 See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 2, at 471, 491 (using a smaller percentage of share 
ownership to characterize control).  
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Silva and Leal (calculating the average as 72%); and Aldrighi and Oliveira (noting an average of 70.7%.).  
Carvalhal-da-Silva and Leal found a median of 71%.  Therefore, the reported drop on ownership structure 
concentration shows a significant change in Brazilian ownership patterns.  
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shareholders holds, on average, 64.79% of the voting capital.85  Nonetheless, six 
companies have significantly more dispersed ownership.  The average voting shares of 
the largest shareholder for these firms is approximately 38.84%. 
Level 1 also has strong ownership concentration of voting shares.  On average, 
the forty-four firms of Level 1 have, on average, approximately 63.14% of voting shares 
owned by the largest shareholder (see Table 10).  Almost 71% of the Level 1 firms have 
controlling shareholders who, on average, control 76.07% of the voting rights.  Only 
thirteen firms, or 29.5% of Level 1 companies, achieve more dispersion of ownership, 
with the largest shareholder owning approximately 32.31% of voting rights, on average. 
As expected, the same pattern of ownership concentration also applies to the 
standard market of Bovespa.  Table 11 shows that approximately 72.67% of the 
companies listed on this market have controlling shareholders.  Of the entire sample of 
183 companies, the largest shareholder holds, on average, 65.50% of the voting shares, 
the three largest and the five largest shareholders approximately retain, respectively, 
81.64% and 85.19% of the voting shares. 
These results confirm our hypotheses.  Concentration of ownership increases 
moving from Novo Mercado to all the other segments which do not have the one-share-
one-vote rule and have less stringent corporate governance requirements.    
It is important to keep in mind that, until this point, the ownership data have not 
been adjusted to reflect the terms of existing shareholders’ agreements on voting rights 
and exercise of control.  Incorporating these agreements into the analysis, the ownership 
structure will likely become more concentrated because minority shareholders will likely 
to be part of a controlling block.   
 
V.3. DIVERGENCE FROM VOTING CAPITAL AND TOTAL CAPITAL 
 
Brazilian law permits corporations to issue non-voting shares.  Companies 
publicly held before Law 10.303/2001 may issue up to two-thirds non-voting shares of 
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 See infra Table 9. 
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the total number of shares.  Companies publicly held after that law passed may issue up 
to 50% non-voting shares of the total shares.86  Therefore, I also analyze the composition 
of voting and non-voting shares to evaluate the divergence between cash flow and voting 
rights.  Voting shares can assure cash flow rights and control rights, but non-voting 
shares can only assure cash flow rights. 
 Total capital for a specific company is available from CVM’s website.  It considers 
all the cash flows rights that voting shares plus non-voting shares provide.  Therefore, 
depending on how many non-voting shares there are, the cash flows rights provided by 
voting shares can be smaller or larger.   
 The divergence between voting capital and total capital determines the level of 
private benefits of control that can be extracted from the corporation. The more 
concentrated cash-flow rights rest in the hands of the largest shareholder, the stronger the 
incentives that she will have to run the firm properly, as doing so will also raise her 
wealth.  On the contrary, the less cash-flow rights a controlling shareholder has, the better 
able she is to extract value to the detriment of minority shareholders and the more firm 
valuation will decrease.  The larger the divergence between control and cash-flow rights, 
the less restrained the controlling shareholder will be to extract value as she will not bear 
the costs of her actions accordingly. 
Table 8 shows no voting or total capital divergence due to Novo Mercado’s one-
share-one-vote requirement.  Table 9 displays total capital data for companies listed on 
Level 2.  On average, the largest shareholder of a Level 2 firm holds only 42.11% of the 
firm’s total capital, even if he or she controls 64.79% of the firm’s voting rights.  This 
results from the issuance of non-voting shares, which expand the firm’s total capital, but 
do not add corresponding voting power.  The largest shareholder holds, on average, 
approximately 18.72% of the non-voting shares of the corporation.   
This divergence is more pronounced in Level 1 firms.  According to Table 10, the 
largest shareholder of a Level 1 firm, on average, has invested 33.4% of the firm’s total 
capital and controlled 63.14% of the voting rights.  This largest shareholder retains, on 
average, only 7.12% of the corporation’s non-voting shares.   
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Table 11 presents data for companies listed on the standard market.  The largest 
shareholder, on average, owns 49.23% of the corporation’s total capital and 65.5% of the 
voting rights.  He or she has invested a larger part of the total capital of the company, 
retaining approximately 22.65% of its non-voting shares. 
Analysis of this information reveals a significant separation of ownership and 
control in Brazilian firms.  However, controlling shareholders have not yet achieved the 
maximum amount of separation possible.  Brazilian Corporate Law 6404/76 allowed the 
issuance of one-third voting shares and two-thirds non-voting shares.  Under the fullest 
extent of this law, the controlling shareholder would only need to hold 16.6% of the total 
capital.  The controlling shareholder would merely need to retain 50% plus one share of 
the voting shares because these shares encompassed one-third of the total capital of the 
company.   
The segment which achieves the largest separation of ownership and control is 
Level 1.  Level 1 majority shareholders have on average 33.4% of the total capital.  But 
they still hold two times the number of shares necessary for the exercise control 
(16.6%).87  The ability of firms to separate ownership from control is considered to be a 
mechanism that explains why ownership is not dispersed in certain environments.88  In 
section VII, I develop this theoretical argument to explain why Level 1 firms still 
concentrate control through the ownership of voting rights.  
 
 
V.4. DATA ON SHARE OWNERSHIP ACCOUNTING FOR SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENTS 
 
Section VI provides a detailed account on the types of shareholders’ agreements 
mostly used and their effects.  In this section, I consider the impact of shareholders’ 
agreements on voting rights and control.   
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Tables 12, 13 and 14 reveal that shareholders’ agreements have a profound effect 
in the concentration of voting rights and control in Brazil.  Table 12 shows that the sixty-
five Novo Mercado companies without a controlling shareholder drop to forty-five firms 
when considering the effects of shareholders’ agreements over control.  Twenty 
companies (30.76%) with diffuse ownership become companies with a clear controlling 
group (owning more than 50% of the voting rights) when shareholders’ agreements are 
taken into account.  Before accounting for the agreements, the largest shareholder from 
these twenty companies held an average of 28.06% of the voting rights.  When 
shareholders’ agreements are considered, the share ownership average of the group of 
shareholders exercising control through such agreements increases to 65.27% for these 
twenty companies.  Overall, the shareholders’ agreements make the average largest stake 
of ownership in the total sample increase from 36.39% to 45.25%.  Nevertheless, the 
main conclusion regarding the larger dispersion of ownership structures in Novo Mercado 
persists.  In contrast to previous studies, the 45.25% average ownership of the agreement-
bound group of shareholders indicates a meaningful decrease of ownership concentration 
in Brazilian firms.  
Table 13 exhibits ownership patterns in Level 2 companies.  Four of the six Level 
2 companies characterized as lacking controlling shareholders have been reincorporated 
into the analysis as companies with a controlling shareholder due to their shareholders’ 
agreements.  Shareholders’ agreements cause the overall average of ownership of the 
largest block of shareholders to rise from 64.79% to 69.6%.  Thus, the impact of 
shareholders’ agreements on ownership of the controlling block is not as accentuated as 
in Novo Mercado. 
Table 14 considers the impact of shareholders’ agreements in the structure of 
firms in Level 1.  Nine of the thirteen firms (69.23%) previously considered to lack a 
controlling shareholder become companies with a controlling shareholder group.  In these 
firms, agreements cause the average of the voting rights retained by the largest 
shareholder group to increase from 27% to approximately 70%.  Overall, the average 
ownership of voting rights for the largest shareholder changes from approximately 
63.14% to 72.75%, revealing an even higher concentration of control in this segment.  
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This analysis shows that shareholders’ agreements are important mechanisms to 
coordinate control in Brazilian corporations.  These agreements tend to be adopted in 
companies where ownership is largely dispersed.  Approximately 40% of these 
companies (thirty-three of the eighty-four companies) have a determined group of 
shareholders that jointly exercise control by means of shareholders’ agreements.  
Considering shareholders’ agreements, the number of companies without controlling 
shareholders drops considerably in all three special segments: from sixty-five to forty-
five in Novo Mercado, from six to two in Level 2, and from thirteen to three in Level 1.  
Novo Mercado is the only listing segment that maintains degree of ownership dispersion, 
with an adjusted average ownership under 50%, even though the number of companies 
with controlling shareholders (forty-seven) surpasses the number of companies without 
controlling shareholders (forty-five) when these agreements are considered.   
This analysis shows that shareholders’ agreements have a profound impact in 
Brazilian corporate ownership and control.  They work as substitute mechanisms to share 
ownership when shareholders have less ownership and control is more dispersed.   They 
provide control concentration and coordination by regulating shared control among few 
shareholders.  
This analysis also points out that current corporate governance literature does not 
consider the impact of these agreements on international patterns of corporate ownership.  
Nonetheless, as the Brazilian experience shows, shareholders’ agreements may be key 
instruments to organize the interests of important blockholders, making control much 
more concentrated in practice than share ownership could reveal. 
 
V.5. DATA ON INDIRECT ULTIMATE LARGEST SHAREHOLDERS 
 
Different types of ultimate shareholders shape different market characteristics 
and, therefore, different types of capitalism.  Well-developed equity markets, such as 
those in the US and Britain, present distinctive features.  Most listed companies in these 
systems have diffused ownership.  Large shareholdings, and especially majority 
ownership, are rare.  In addition, very few large companies are family-controlled.  In both 
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the United States and Britain, institutional investors, like pension and mutual funds and 
insurance companies, retain significant ownership of listed companies, even if they own 
minority stakes in large public companies.89  These particular types of ownership afford 
different types of governance practices.90 
This section analyses the use and effect of pyramiding on corporate control 
structures.  Pyramiding implies a discrepancy between the ultimate owner’s total capital 
and control rights.  The total capital is given by the product of ownership stakes along the 
chain.  If a shareholder owns 40% of Firm A and Firm A owns 20% of Firm B, then this 
shareholder owns 8% of Firm B’s cash flow rights.  Control rights are measured by the 
weakest link in the control chain.  In the former example, the shareholder would control 
Firm B with 20% of the voting rights. 
I now analyze shareholder composition backwards to identify the ultimate main 
shareholders of Brazilian corporations.91  I classify the ultimate largest shareholder in one 
of the following categories: 1) individuals or families, 2) foreign investors (individuals or 
institutions), 3) government, 4) institutional investors (banks, insurance firms, pension 
funds, foundations or investment funds).  For companies that do not have a controlling 
shareholder, I identify the largest ultimate shareholder – the shareholder who owns the 
largest number of voting shares of the corporation.  
In practice, one has to make several assumptions in order to calculate indirect 
ownership structures.  Some of these assumptions include: a) how one defines each 
defining category (for example, how one defines ‘institutional investors’), and b) how 
one groups different families that are the main shareholders of one company. 
Regarding the first assumption, banks are typically considered to be institutional 
investors.92  However, in many countries, banks can be controlled by families. Therefore 
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 See e.g., Leal, supra note __. 
 34 
classifying banks as institutional investors may distort the measures of corporate 
ownership if one does not assess the bank’s main shareholders.  The same applies  to 
investment funds.  Only when participation in an investment fund is not disclosed in 
CVM dataset, I treat those funds as institutional investors.  Therefore, the data for 
individual or family ownership may be underestimated. 
Regarding the second assumption, Diagram 1 shows the ownership structure of 
Klabin S.A.  We can distinguish three families as the main shareholders of Klabin S.A.: 
the Lafers, the Pivas and the Klabins.  The results of indirect ownership structure will 
vary according to whether we group these families among themselves as one big family, 
two joint families or three separated families.  There is some evidence that these families 
might constitute one single family.  For example, the name of one holding company is 
Jacob Klabin Lafer Adm e Part. SA, which might lead us to conclude that Klabin and 
Lafer have a family relationship.  The main shareholders of this company nonetheless are 
Miguel Lafer and Vera Lafer.  Another example would be Sylvia Lafer Piva, Horacio 
Lafer Piva and Eduardo Lafer Piva, who carry two names of the main families.  
Therefore, results will change depending on how we aggregate these families.  One can 
consider the Klabins comprising one family separate from the Lafers and the Pivas.  In 
this situation the Klabins controls 57.22%, while the Lafers owns 45.36% of the voting 
capital structure, and the Pivas own 20.32% of the voting rights.  In a second situation, if 
one considers Lafer and Piva as one family group, separated from the Klabins, the result 
will be that the Lafers and Pivas will be the controlling shareholders with 57.88% of the 
voting rights.  For table 19, I treated the three families as being part of the same family.  
The Klabins, the Lafers and Pivas jointly control 59.5% of the voting capital of Klabin 
SA and 20.55% of the total capital.   
Other cases, such as Medial Saude SA, are simpler.  Medial Saude SA has three 
main families (Kalil, Rocha Mello, and Schapira) who control 75% of the company´s 
voting capital.  There is no apparent evidence that those families are related.  Therefore, 
for the purposes of this study, I considered these families as three separated main 
shareholders.  However, if they happen to be part of the same family in practice, I have 
underestimated the concentration of family control.  Therefore, my analysis assumes that 
different last names designate different shareholders.  In contrast, shareholders with the 
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same last names are considered to belong to the same family group.  As Faccio and Lang 
pointed out, this convention may understate family affiliation and, therefore, 
concentration of control.93 
I find that individual and family ownership are clearly dominant in Brazilian 
corporations.  Of the twenty-seven firms listed on Novo Mercado with controlling 
shareholders, twenty of them (74.07%) are controlled by individuals or families (Table 
15).  The large majority (17 out of 20) of companies controlled by either individuals or 
families are controlled by means of a pyramidal structure.  In Novo Mercado’s firms 
without a controlling shareholder, individual or family ownership also accounts for the 
largest stake of shares in corporations.  Of sixty-five companies without a controlling 
shareholder, thirty-seven companies have individuals or families as the ultimate largest 
shareholders.  Overall, as Table 15 shows, individual or family ownership is found in 
fifty-seven firms, which amounts to 39.75% of Novo Mercado’s total market 
capitalization (Table 16).  Foreign companies are the second largest shareholders.  They 
are the largest ultimate shareholder in twenty-four companies, 21.86% of the entire 
sample of Novo Mercado’s firms.  Institutional shareholders are the largest ultimate 
shareholders of six companies and account for 15.08% of Novo Mercado’s market 
capitalization, (Table 16).  Only five companies are government-owned, but government 
ownership amounts to 23.31 % of the market capitalization of the segment (Table 16).   
Table 17 displays ownership data for companies listed on Level 2.  Considering 
companies with a controlling shareholder, individual or family ownership (8) still 
predominates in relation to foreign ownership (4).  Considering companies without a 
controlling shareholder, individuals or family ownership is found in five out of six 
companies.  Individual or family ownership is responsible for 63.62% of the market 
capitalization, followed by foreign companies and the government with 21.12% and 
15.26% respectively (Table 18). 
Information on the ultimate shareholder in Level 1 is found in Table 19.  
Individual and family ownership is also pervasive.  Twenty-one out of thirty-one 
companies that have controlling shareholders are individual or family-held.  Individuals 
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and families are also the largest ultimate shareholder of nine out of thirteen companies 
without a controlling shareholder.  Table 19 also shows that individuals and families 
greatly rely on pyramidal structures to exercise control.  Control is kept through indirect 
control structures in twenty-seven of twenty-nine companies that have individuals and 
families as either the controlling or the largest ultimate shareholders.  Table 20 shows 
that individual or family ownership responds for the second largest market capitalization 
(40.57%).  Institutional shareholders are responsible for the first largest market 
capitalization (48.16%), even though they either control or are the largest ultimate 
shareholders of only six companies.   
Table 21 reports ownership data for companies listed on the standard market.  
Individual/family ownership is also dominant, followed by foreign ownership.  Of the 
133 companies with controlling shareholders, seventy-eight are controlled by 
individuals/families, seventy-one of them by means of indirect mechanisms (pyramids).  
They are also the largest ultimate shareholders of thirty-seven corporations (out of fifty 
companies without a controlling shareholder).  But in terms of market capitalization, 
individual/family ownership accounts for only 9.87% (Table 22).  This shows that most 
companies tend to be small, and hardly match the concept of a true publicly-held 
company.  The government is the first largest ultimate shareholder in terms of the 
standard level’s market capitalization, with 48.63% (eighteen companies).  Foreign 
ownership represents the second largest market capitalization.  Foreign shareholders are 
the largest ultimate shareholders in thirty-seven companies and achieve 39.18% of the 
standard market capitalization. 
Table 23 provides an overview on the general use of non-voting shares and 
pyramidal structures by the different types of last ultimate owners.  Considering the 
whole sample of companies with available information (339), 163 companies make use 
of both pyramidal structures and non-voting shares.  Sixty-seven companies adopt 
pyramidal structures and sixty-two companies adopt non-voting shares.  Therefore 
approximately 86% of the firms in the sample separate of ownership and control through 
these mechanisms.  Considering all the companies of the sample, approximately 69% of 
them present non-voting shares, and 66% present pyramidal structures.  Individuals and 
families are by far the groups that adopt these mechanisms for separation of ownership 
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and control.  Considering the whole sample, 51.03% of the firms have individuals and 
families as last ultimate shareholders that make use of pyramidal structures and 43.66% 
that also adopt non-voting shares.   
Several studies have found that large shareholdings are usually associated with 
families.94  I find that family ownership increases in the segments that are characterized 
by more concentrated ownership.  Family firms’ heavy reliance on pyramidal structures 
shows that they are used to organizing interests of the several family members.  . 
 
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF GREATER DISPERSION OF OWNERSHIP ON CORPORATE 




This section develops the main consequences generated by the increase of ownership 
dispersion in Brazilian capital markets.  I detect two main developments: widespread use 
of shareholders’ agreements as mechanisms to coordinate joint control and adoption of 
anti-takeover devices to avoid hostile takeovers. 
 
VI.1.  TYPES OF SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENTS 
 
As ownership has become more dispersed in the market, shareholders’ 
agreements have increasingly been used to coordinate control.  The Brazilian Corporate 
Law provides that shareholders’ agreements can regulate the purchase and sale of shares, 
preference to acquire shares, the exercise of voting rights, or the exercise of control.95  
Shareholders’ agreements may be mixed to address more than one of these subjects.  The 
Corporate Law also contains specific rules regarding disclosure of these agreements.  
                                                 
94
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observed by the corporation when filed in its head office.”). 
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While shareholders’ agreements are generally kept private in many jurisdictions,96 in 
Brazil these agreements must be duly entered in the corporation’s registration books to be 
enforceable against third parties.97  They bind the corporation itself provided that they are 
filed with the corporation’s head office.98  Therefore, shareholders have strong incentives 
to disclose these agreements.99  If shareholders do not register the agreements with the 
company, agreements will be enforceable only between the signing parties.100 
The 2001 Corporate Law reform expanded shareholders’ agreements’ ability to 
control corporate actions.  Directors elected by shareholders who have signed such an 
agreement are required to vote in accordance with the terms of the agreement.101  Votes 
cast in breach of the agreement will not be considered by the president of the meeting.102  
Therefore, shareholders’ agreements now play an even more critical role in corporate 
governance.  They cannot only regulate the control exercise and voting rights of 
shareholders, but also bind directors’ votes to the terms of the agreement and therefore 
diminish directors’ independence. 
The disclosure of shareholders’ agreements to the public presents an interesting 
research opportunity.  Black, Carvalho and Gorga survey corporate governance practices 
in Brazil, based on an extensive 2005 survey.  They find that thirty-six (42%) of the 
Brazilian private companies in their sample have a shareholders’ agreements among the 
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members of the controlling family or group.103  In twenty-four (67%) of these firms, the 
shareholder agreement ensures joint control.104  The authors also report that in twenty-two 
firms, one or more non-independent directors were elected in accordance with a 
shareholders’ agreement.  In twelve firms, four or more directors are elected under a 
shareholders’ agreement, forming a majority of the board.105  Thus, shareholders’ 
agreements perform an important role in Brazilian corporate governance. 
I collected and analyzed all shareholders’ agreements provided by companies 
without a controlling shareholder to Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios.  These agreements 
are available along with other material information on publicly-held companies disclosed 
at CVM’s website.   
Shareholders’ agreements are deemed to be material information.106  Therefore, 
engaging, amending or breaching these agreements immediately trigger disclosure 
obligations to the market.  I collected shareholders’ agreements dating from September to 
December 2007.  I focus on agreements of companies without a controlling shareholder 
because their shareholders’ agreements are likely to produce more relevant effects on 
corporate control.  My objective is to understand whether shareholders’ agreements are 
being used as substitute mechanisms in order to assure control when ownership has 
become more dispersed.  Companies with controlling shareholders might have 
shareholders’ agreements which I do not investigate in this paper.  Intuitively, these 
agreements are less likely to regulate control itself, and may regulate the (preference for) 
purchase or sale of shares, or the relation between controlling shareholders and strategic 
minority shareholders. 
The sample consists of eighty-four Novo Mercado, Level 2 and Level 1 
companies without a controlling shareholder.  Initially, I find that fifty-four of these 
companies have shareholders’ agreements available for download on the CVM website.  I 
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 See Instruction CVM No. 358/2002, art. 2, Unique Paragraph, I, II and III (considering shareholders’ 
agreements material information (“fato relevante”) when they cause changes in the control of the company, 
when they are entered in the register books of the corporation, or when the corporation is an intervening 
party in the agreement). 
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then access the percentage of shares each agreement binds to establish whether the 
agreements affect the control of the companies.  A company without a controlling 
shareholder may have a de facto controlling shareholder group due to the shareholders’ 
agreement.  Nonetheless I find many inconsistencies when attempting to establish the 
percentage of shares that are bound by the shareholders’ agreements.  These 
inconsistencies mostly emerge when comparing agreements’ parties with the company’s 
reported shareholding ownership structure available on CVM.  For example, consider the 
case of COSAN SA Indústria e Comércio.  At the time of the research, there were two 
shareholders’ agreements available for download for this company at CVM’s website. 
Apparently both were valid shareholders’ agreements.  However, the company latest IAN 
(also available on CVM)  refers only to the existence of one agreement.  Furthermore, the 
shareholders that signed one agreement do not correspond to the shareholders who are 
reported in the company’s shareholding structure available in the IAN.  In order to 
resolve this contradiction, I contacted the company.  After conversations with the investor 
relations officer, I was informed that the shareholders’ agreement under analysis is no 
longer effective.  Similarly, phone calls were made to all companies with inconsistent 
data in order to clarify questions on validity, contracting parties and the percentage of 
shares included in shareholders’ agreements.   
This process revealed that forty-two, or 50%, of the companies have valid 
shareholders’ agreements.  The distribution of companies that have these agreements 
among the listing segments are as follows: twenty-eight (66.67%) Novo Mercado 
companies, four (9.52%) Level 2 companies, and ten (23.81%) Level 1 companies.  The 
majority of companies without controlling shareholders that have shareholders’ 
agreements come from Novo Mercado, which has the largest number of companies with 
more dispersed control.  Shareholders’ agreements, especially voting and control 
agreements, are most likely to be adopted by companies that have more dispersion of 
ownership. 
I then inquire about the scope of these shareholders’ agreements.  Table 24 shows 
the types of agreements that shareholders engage in.  Sixteen of the forty-two 
shareholders’ agreements (38.1%) are mixed to regulate preferences to acquire shares and 
voting rights.  Twelve shareholders’ agreements (28.57%) regulate the sale and purchase 
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of shares, the preference to acquire shares, voting rights and control exercise.  Three 
shareholders’ agreements (7.14%) include clauses on preferences to acquire shares and 
voting rights.   
I classify shareholders’ agreements as control agreements when they regulate 
control exercised by shareholders that jointly own more that 50% of the corporation’s 
voting rights.  I stringently define control according to the definition of controlling 
shareholder adopted in this paper.  The most predominant clause found in thirty-nine out 
of forty-two shareholders’ agreements (92.86%) refers to the exercise of shareholders’ 
voting power.  Of these, seven shareholders’ agreements bind shareholders that have less 
than 50% of the voting rights.107  One could argue that voting rights agreements could 
also regulate control when a group of minority shareholders coordinate their votes, even 
if they do not jointly own 50% of the voting shares.  One example is the Inpar S.A. 
agreement, which binds 41.42% of the voting shares of the corporation.  While this 
agreement could be considered as a control agreement, I prefer to classify it as a voting 
agreement to maintain a consistent definition of control in this paper.  Any agreement that 
relies on a ownership based on less than 50% of the voting rights require a case-by-case 
analysis to verify whether shareholders exercised control.  This could lead to arbitrary 
decisions.  My analysis, therefore, may underestimate the number of minority control 
agreements that can exist in practice.   
Another caveat regarding agreements’ classification is important.  I have 
formally (literally) and qualitatively analyzed the contents of these agreements.  At first, I 
consider control agreements the agreements expressly regulating control issues.  Only 
nine (28.13%) agreements are literal control agreements.  The other twenty-three 
agreements (71.87%) are classified as control agreements because they bind more than 
50% of the voting shares of a corporation.  These numbers show that most control 
agreements are not literal agreements.  Therefore my classification may not match the 
literal classification contained in the agreements themselves, but I believe that content 
analysis provides a clearer idea of the effects of shareholders’ agreements.   
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One example is Abyara SA.’s shareholders’ agreement which binds 52.9% of the 
voting shares.  The text of the agreement regulates the behavior of stockholders and the 
exercise of voting rights and the transfer of the shares bound in the agreement.  
Nonetheless, the agreement does not make explicit that one of its objectives is to regulate 
control.  Instead, one of its expressed objectives is “to provide general orientation for the 
business management of the company.”108  The agreement states that shareholders hold a 
preliminary meeting to decide voting orientation prior to any general meeting of the 
company.  Thus, upon analysis of its content, it is clear that the agreement regulates not 
only voting rights, but also the joint exercise of control.  Therefore, even if shareholders 
do not consider this a control agreement, I classify it as a control agreement.   
The same rationale applies to the case of Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Bio. Ol. 
Veg. S.A., which has a shareholders’ agreement binding 65.3% of the voting shares.  The 
agreement does not mention explicitly that it regulates corporate control.  Yet it states 
that parties to the agreement aim “to regulate their reciprocal relations, notably with 
respect to stocks transfers, exercise of voting rights and management of the company.”109  
Thus, the agreement is clearly a control agreement.  Agreements categorized as control 
agreements are also classified as voting rights agreement because control cannot be 
exercised without the coordination of voting rights.  So every control agreement will 
inevitably encompass a voting rights agreement.  
Table 24 reflects this more comprehensive qualitative classification of control.  I 
find that thirty-two out of forty-two shareholders’ agreements include regulation, among 
other issues, of control.  Therefore, control agreements are adopted by 76.19% of the 
companies that have shareholders’ agreements.  Focusing on Novo Mercado, which is 
segment with the largest number of shareholders’ agreements, I find that twenty-six out 
of twenty-eight shareholders’ agreements are either control agreements (19) or voting 
agreements (7).  This result confirms my hypothesis: the majority of companies without a 
controlling shareholder adopt shareholders’ agreements to coordinate control or voting 
rights as a substitute for share ownership.   
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I now analyze to what extent shareholders’ agreements bind director’s votes.  
From the forty-two companies that have shareholders’ agreements, twenty-six (61.90%) 
of them have shareholders’ agreements that bind directors’ votes.  Of these twenty-six 
companies, sixteen (61.53%) of them specify instances in which directors’ votes are 
bound and ten do not. 
Table 25 displays the detailed content of the clauses of sixteen agreements that 
bind directors’ votes.  It shows that shareholders’ agreements of fourteen companies 
(87.50%) regulate votes on transactions resulting in sale and/or actions affecting 
company assets.  Eleven companies’ (68.75%) agreements bind directors votes on 
distributions of earnings and dividends.  Ten companies (62.50%) have agreements that 
control directors’ votes on contracts within the value range stipulated in the agreement,  
and budget approval.  Nine companies (56.25%) have agreements that dominate votes on 
the issuance of securities.  Eight companies’ agreements (50%) regulate the election or 
dismissal of managers.  Six companies (37.5%) have agreements that have power over 
directors’ votes on merger, acquisition, incorporation, liquidation and corporate 
transformation, approval or dismissal of independent auditors and others.  Four 
companies (25%) use shareholders’ agreements to restrict compensation policies and 
benefits for managers and board members, reduction or increase in the social capital, and 
creation of joint ventures, among other things.  
This analysis presents a paradox.  While some companies have been complying 
with better standards of corporate governance, they have shareholders’ agreements that 
constrain directors’ votes in practice.  Therefore, directors lose their independence.  As 
discussed previously, this situation is oddly endorsed by the current Brazilian legislation.  
This total lack of director’s independence is at odds with Level 2’s and Novo Mercado’s 
rules for good corporate governance.  It is also contrary to current international corporate 
governance recommendations.  
Level 2’s and Novo Mercado’s rules require that the board of directors must have 
 44 
at least five members, from which at least 20% shall be independent members.110  
Bovespa defines independence in Section II of Novo Mercado’s Regulation.  According 
to this section an “Independent Director”  
 is characterized by (i) not having any ties with the Company, except capital 
participation; ii) not being a Controlling Shareholder, husband, wife, or second 
level relative of the Controlling Shareholder, or not being, in the last 3 years, 
connected to a company or an entity related to the Controlling Shareholder 
(people connected to public institutions of education and/or research are excluded 
from this restriction); (iii) not being, in the last 3 years, employee or officer of the 
company; of the Controlling Shareholder or of a firm controlled by the Company 
(iv) not being supplier or buyer, direct or indirect, of services and/or products of 
the Company, in magnitude which implies a loss of independence; (v) not being 
an employee or manager of a company or entity which is offering or demanding 
services and/or products to the Company; (vi) not being husband, wife or second 
level relative of any manager of the company; (vii) not receiving remuneration of 
the Company other than that of a director (compensation originated from capital 
participation is excluded from this restriction).111  
 
This definition does not clarify whether or not directors bound by shareholders’ 
agreements would be considered independent.  It remains unclear how Bovespa assesses 
the number of independent directors of companies listed on the special segments that 
require compliance with the 20% of independent directors’ threshold.  If Bovespa 
considers those directors bound by shareholders’ agreements as independent, it is clearly 
making a mistake.  Directors bound by shareholders’ agreements cannot be deemed 
independent.  These agreements directly interfere in decisions that directors make 
because they determine ex ante how directors ought to vote before they have analyzed a 
situation and reached an independent conclusion.   
One may even dispute whether having independent directors is good for corporate 
governance, as there is evidence that they do not contribute to improving company 
performance.112  However, if Bovespa has decided that having independent directors is an 
important rule for good corporate governance, it should enforce its own rules.   
Independent directors are considered important in developing countries which 
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typically have boards dominated by representatives of the controlling shareholders.113  In 
those countries, having independent directors may contribute to decreasing levels of 
expropriation and, as a consequence, augmenting the company’s wealth.  Evidence 
supports that having more independent directors is associated with better corporate 
performance in emerging markets.  A study by Black, Jang and Kim  found that requiring 
large firms have a majority of outside directors has caused increased stock price in Korea 
by 40%.  The market valued the companies’ existing cash flow higher apparently because 
a perception that outside directors help eliminate insider self-dealing.114 
To conclude, this study obviates the fact that control comes in different forms.  
Despite the current focus of the literature, control does not only come through equity 
ownership in a direct or indirect way (pyramids).  It can also take contractual forms.  This 
section presents evidence concerning consequences of shareholders’ agreements to 
corporate governance. Shareholders’ agreements work as substitute control mechanisms 
when ownership is more dispersed.  As the Brazilian experience shows, when 
shareholders do not have enough ownership to assure control, they can rely on 
shareholders’ agreements to coordinate joint control.  This is the case mainly in Novo 
Mercado, which concentrates the vast majority of the companies that adopt control or 
voting agreements.  Furthermore, Brazilian shareholders’ agreements also bind votes of 
directors in certain matters, lessening director independence.  Thus, under certain 
circumstances, board decisions may not be based on  the best interests of the corporation 
or minority shareholders.   
 
VI.3.  CHANGES IN BYLAWS: ANTI-TAKEOVER CLAUSES  
 
Takeovers have been extremely rare in the Brazilian capital markets due to the 
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ownership structure of Brazilian corporations discussed in Part III.115  Control 
transactions have usually been conducted by means of private agreements, in which a 
large control premium is paid to the seller of control.116  In 2001, a reform to 
Corporations Law 6404/76 reintroduced a mandatory rule for tag along rights in sales of 
control.  This rule, Article 254-A, provides that minority voting shareholders must 
receive 80% of the price paid for a controlling shareholder’s voting shares in a sale of 
control.   
Additionally, Bovespa burdened private sales of corporate control.  It introduced 
a “super” tag along right in the listing requirements of Novo Mercado and Level 2.  
Under this rule, the acquirer of control in a private sale must indemnify all other 
shareholders from whom the acquirer purchased shares six months before the control 
transaction.  The acquirer will be required to pay the same price paid to the shares of the 
controlling shareholder.  Indemnification should take place on top of the usual tender 
offer to acquire all minority shares as required by the corporate law 6404/76.  Table 26 
shows that, companies from Novo Mercado and Level 2 and a few companies from Level 
1 have also voluntarily adopted the super tag along clause. 
As ownership structures have been changing, one may think that potential 
acquirers may be able to acquire control more easily in the market.  However, anti-
takeover defenses have begun to appear in company’s bylaws as ownership has become 
increasingly dispersed.  The media has already pointed out this phenomenon.117  
However, there has been no attempt to analyze the extension of their use in a systematic 
way.   
To fill this gap and examine the evolution of Brazilian capital markets and 
corporate governance, this article empirically analyzes how many companies have 
adopted defenses and which defenses are most common.  The sample includes bylaws of 
eighty-four companies listed in Novo Mercado, Level 2 and Level 1, which do not have a 
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controlling shareholder.  I focus on these companies118 because they are mostly likely to 
have anti-takeover defenses due to their larger degree of ownership dispersion.119  The 
bylaws have been collected from IANs delivered to CVM at the end of April of 2007, 
referring to year-end 2006.  Changes in bylaws during the year of 2007 must be disclosed 
and updated in CVM´s website.  I collected the bylaws between September and 
December of 2007.  
Brazil has developed defenses other than the poison pill, which is the most trivial 
anti-takeover defense in the United States.  A poison pill is a typical shareholder rights 
plan in the United States and involves a target issuing rights to its existing shareholders to 
acquire a large number of new stocks.  Holders can buy more stocks under market value 
when anyone acquires a pre-determined amount of target’s stock (typically 10-20%) in a 
possible control acquisition.  This strategy dilutes the percentage of target’s common 
shares that the bidder owns, making it more expensive to acquire control of the company.  
In Brazil, the predominant takeover defense is a provision in the company’s charter that 
allows current shareholders to sell their shares to an acquirer who attains a critical limit of 
target’s shares.  In this sense it resembles the mandatory tender offer required by law but 
is triggered by a lower threshold of shares’ acquistion.  Nonethless, the media calls this 
defense a poison pill.  Yet this type of takeover defense might not completely stop a 
determined acquirer.  Instead, it ensures minority shareholders the right to tender their 
shares at a fair price if they think this is a good time to sell.  This strategy also makes the 
target acquisition much more expensive to the bidder. 
The use of anti-takeover clauses is widespread.  Forty-seven out of eighty-four 
companies, or approximately 56% of the sample companies, have included antitakeover 
protections in their bylaws.  
There appear to be two prevalent types of defenses.  A “Type A” anti-takeover 
defense provides that once a determined threshold of ownership is met, the acquiring 
shareholder must make a tender offer to acquire all outstanding shares.  This threshold of 
                                                 
118
 For this Section, the same definition applies: a controlling shareholder is considered to have more than 
50% of the voting stocks. 
119
 The underlining idea is that the controlling shareholder of a company does not need to be concerned 
with including poison pill clauses in the bylaws because control cannot be sold without his or her consent. 
 48 
acquisition generally ranges from 10% to 35% of the shares.  Brazilian Corporate Law 
does not require an acquirer to offer minority shareholders to tender their stock for sale if 
the acquirer has purchased the control in the market.  The mandatory tag along right 
requires a tender offer only for a sale of a controlling block by the controlling 
shareholder.120  This clause, on the other hand, requires a tender offer of shares even if 
control was acquired in the market, making hostile takeovers as burdensome as a private 
sales of control.   
A “Type B” anti-takeover defense, in contrast, is triggered when a shareholder 
who has acquired a pre-determined threshold of ownership wishes to purchase more 
shares.  In that situation, that shareholder has to communicate his or her intention to the 
Investor Relations Manager of the company and the Manager of Trading Activity of the 
stock exchange.  This threshold of acquisition generally ranges from 5% to 30% of the 
shares.  The Manager of Trading Activity can then arrange a tender offer conducted by an 
open auction in the exchange market.  This provision aims to promote competition 
between bidders interested in acquiring the company’s control.   
Table 26 categorizes the types of anti takeover clauses adopted by each company 
listed in Bovespa’s special segments.  It shows that 36.9% of the companies adopt 
exclusively Type A clauses.  Approximately 14.28% of the companies adopt Type A and 
Type B clauses.  Only four firms (4.76%) exclusively use Type B clauses.  Table 26 also 
provides the thresholds of Type A and B clauses that will trigger the acquirer’s 
obligation.  Approximately 53.5% of Type A companies adopt a 20% threshold.  For 
Type B companies, 43.75% adopt a 10% threshold. 
The widespread adoption of anti-takeover defenses implies that lawyers acted 
faster than Brazilian regulators.  Brazilian law does not regulate the use of these clauses.  
The preceding analysis has covered only bylaws of firms without a controlling 
shareholder.  However, available information shows that companies controlled by a 
controlling shareholder who holds more than 51% of the voting capital have also adopted 
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defenses.121  This demonstrates that lawyers have been eager to avoid future changes in 
control, even if a hostile takeover were factually impossible at that time.  It is worth 
noting that it is unclear why a company with a controlling shareholder would include 
anti-takeover defenses clauses in its bylaws.  In that situation, the clause would constrain 
the sale of the controlling shareholder who may later want to sell its control block, which 
would be contrary to a wealth maximizing behavior from a rational economic agent.  
This situation appears to show that controlling shareholders do not understand the effect 
of the clauses and that lawyers did not clarifying the full implications of anti-takeover 
clauses to their clients.  Arguably, the controlling shareholder can call a meeting and 
amend the bylaws to exclude the clause.  In this case, the defense would generate 
additional transaction costs before the sale of control. 
  Nonetheless, Brazilian players seem to be celebrating the adoption of anti-
takeover defenses.  Dispersed ownership is usually associated with more mature capital 
markets.  Players may want companies’ bylaws to provide anti-takeover mechanisms 
because takeovers would again concentrate control.  According to this rationale, anti-
takeover defenses are considered to be useful devices to promote and stabilize diffused 
ownership.  They are devices companies use to signal that their ownership structure will 
continue to be dispersed. 
  In other environments, anti-takeover defenses are generally considered wealth 
decreasing mechanisms that safeguard control from outside monitoring.  They are 
typically designed by managers.  Because managers seek to entrench themselves, 
defenses are usually thought to increase agency costs between the management and 
shareholders.   
  Takeovers are widely believed to be wealth maximizing because they replace 
inefficient management with a more efficient one, promoting allocation of resources to a 
higher use value.  The threat of a hostile takeover is considered to discipline incumbent 
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management.122  If managers do not run the company properly, the company will lose its 
value and become a potential target for a hostile takeover. 
In Brazil, if the current situation persists, poor managers may not face this type of 
market discipline.  Many bylaws go even further than providing mandatory tender offer 
clauses.  They establish penalty clauses that are triggered if the tender offers clauses are 
breached.  The adoption of penalty clauses is pervasive.  Of the forty-seven companies 
that adopt anti-takeover defenses, 100% adopt at least one penalty clause.  There are two 
types of penalty clauses . 
Penalty clause “Type 1” provides that if the acquirer does not comply with the 
tender offer clause, the board of directors will call an extraordinary shareholder meeting.  
The board will deliberate about the suspension of shareholder rights of the acquirer’s of 
control.  The suspension of rights will apply to the shares that were acquired in disregard 
of the tender offer clause.  The shareholder that has acquired the control will not be able 
to cast votes in this meeting.  He or she may also be subjected to liability for damages 
suffered by the other shareholders in connection with the breach of the tender offer.  This 
penalty clause is therefore applied against the acquirer of blockholdings. 
Penalty clause “Type 2” provides that any future change in the bylaws that 
restrict shareholders’ rights to tender their shares according to the tender offer clause will 
obligate shareholders who approved the change to make a tender offer to acquire the 
shares of the other shareholders.  Basically, they prevent anti-takeover clauses from being 
excluded from bylaws, even if the majority of shareholders want to deliberate their 
exclusion in a shareholder meeting.  This happens because the huge costs imposed on 
shareholders that approve this exclusion.  Interestingly, as some commentators have said, 
under Type 2 penalty clauses, Brazilian anti-takeover clauses seems to acquire status of 
fundamental rights that cannot be contracted around.  These penalty clauses are applied 
against to shareholders who want to ban the tender offer clause, regardless of whether 
they want to take this action to protect the welfare of the corporation.  
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The data displayed in Table 26 show that of the forty-seven companies that adopt 
penalty clauses, twenty-five (53.19%) companies exclusively use penalty clause Type 1.  
Twenty-two (46.81%) companies adopt both clauses types 1 and 2.  Clause Type 2 is not 
solely adopted.  Only eight companies (10.81%) have bylaws that explicitly state that the 
tender offer clause can be removed.123  Of these eight, only three companies establish a 
qualified quorum for the approval of changes concerning the clause.124  Six of the eight 
companies confer authority power to the shareholder meeting to remove the tender offer 
clause.  The remaining two companies confer this authority to the board of directors. 
This analysis shows that changes in ownership patterns towards more dispersed 
ownership have produced important effects in companies’ bylaws.  It has prompted 
shareholders to adopt takeover defenses.  These defenses may not correspond to a factual 
threat of takeover attacks, as there still is a significant degree of concentrated ownership 
in most companies that could preclude takeovers threats.  As illustrated by the Sadia 
versus Pedigao case and confirmed by our data, most Brazilian companies are still 
controlled by a small group of blockholders who could easily coordinate defenses against 
outside attacks.125  Nonetheless, the Brazilian anti-takeover clauses show an interesting 
effect of ownership structures on corporate governance practices. 
 
VII. THE DETERMINANTS OF CHANGES IN OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES   
 
This Section builds on empirical evidence from Brazil to advance theoretical 
hypotheses explaining changes in corporate ownership.  Ownership structures are key 
distinguishing features underlying different forms of capitalism.126 Yet we still know 
remarkably little about the motives that drive changes in ownership structures.   
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Scholars argue that initial patterns of stock ownership tend to create structures and 
set rules that contribute to the maintenance of this very pattern of ownership structure.127  
According to this thesis, path dependence would prevent changes from occurring.  There 
could be a critical moment where the costs of adhering to the same structure would 
surpass the benefits of adopting a new structure.  At this point, the path could be broken, 
and dispersed ownership would then develop.128  Ownership structure is then dependent 
on prevailing institutions existing in an environment.  As we have seen, the persistence of 
traditional Brazilian firms in segments of poor corporate governance supports the path-
dependence hypotheses.  On the other hand, the significant change towards more 
significant levels of ownership dispersion begs the question what the reasons are that 
prompted this evolution. 
 Scholars have recently discussed the preconditions necessary for developing 
strong capital markets.129  They have analyzed how institutions affect corporate 
ownership and focused their research on legal, social and political institutions.  La Porta 
et al. have analyzed the factors that may bring about critical change towards dispersed 
ownership.130  They argued that protective legal rules would be a key factor in diffusing 
ownership.  They pointed out that common law countries tend to protect more investors 
and stockholders, and therefore have achieved more significant levels of ownership 
dispersion.131  Other scholars contend that private regulation by stock exchanges is more 
important,132 along with a country’s social norms regarding business behavior.133  And 
still others have argued that politics must foster dispersed ownership.134 
Understanding the determinants of changes in corporate ownership in Brazil 
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requires detailed investigation of several variables that could potentially affect this 
outcome.  Some of these may include macro variables such as level of financial 
development, tax and competition policy, labor rights, shareholder and debt holder  
rights, industrial and trade policy, merger activity, cultural beliefs, political relationships 
between dominant families and the power structure, private initiative development, and 
listing in outside markets.  Some variables may be attributed to micro-related firm-
specific characteristics such as company size, age, capital structure, finance needs, level 
of private benefits of control extraction, industry segment, and others.  While I do not 
attempt to test empirically the broad range of theories explaining ownership structure 
changes, I explore some potential explanations that are supported by the data raised by 
this paper.   
 
a) Merger Activity 
Intense merger activity may be related to profound changes in corporate structure.  
For instance, scholars attribute the increase of widely held companies to the corporate 
reorganization that was necessary to achieve after merger waves in the United States.  For 
example, the paradigmatic merger of seven steel companies brought about the creation of 
a large steel conglomerate with a high level of dispersed shares.  No single investor could 
own large stakes of ownership in such a large company.135  In the late 1930s, few 
corporations had families with controlling stakes, though many still had families 
dominating the board of directors.136  In the United Kingdom, Frank, Mayers and Rossi 
point out that mergers played a more important role in ownership dilution.137  In Britain, 
family ownership shrunk when their holdings were diluted in the process of issuing 
shares to acquire other companies.138  Therefore dispersed ownership in Britain was 
mainly a product of takeover activity during the twentieth century.  Families retained 
control through disproportional representation on boards of directors in relation to their 
equity in the first half of the century.  In the second half of the century, institutional 
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ownership replaced families and rapidly extinguished their control.139  
 Although merger waves can quickly change ownership structures, no clear 
connection between present changes in Brazilian ownership structures and an 
extraordinary upheaval in merger activity exists.  Interestingly, a new merger wave is 
currently occurring.  Companies raised financing in the capital markets over the past two 
years.  In 2008, fewer companies have gone public on Bovespa due to the decrease of 
stock prices in the New York Stock Exchange and Bovespa,140 and many firms have 
announced merger plans.141 
  
 b) Cross-Listing 
 Another potential explanation for the upsurge of firms listing on Novo Mercado 
could be that corporations are cross-listing.  New firms listing in foreign exchanges and 
offering equity in other markets must comply with better corporate governance because 
of legal and listing requirements of other markets.  In this case, the costs of listing on 
Novo Mercado would be much smaller to these firms.  So, companies listing on Novo 
Mercado could be signaling that they would also comply with good corporate governance 
in the national market.   
 However, the data do not support this hypothesis.  The majority of IPOs 
conducted in the market was not accompanied by ADRs’ issuance.  From the __ IPOs 
made on Novo Mercado, only __ were accompanied by listings in international stock 
exchanges.  Although many offerings were also destined to foreign investors according to 
Rule 144-A and Regulation S, these offerings did not require any special effort of 
corporate governance compliance to international standards.  
c) Life Cycle   
The life-cycle theory holds that young corporations are more likely to present 
concentrated ownership, while older companies are more likely to be widely held.142  It 
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assumes that large corporations started as family businesses and evolved into widely held 
businesses in a few countries with a reasonably long industrial history.143  Implicitly in 
this assumption is the fact that during the life cycle of the firm, it will grow and need 
increasing levels of capital to perform its activities.  Thus, more shareholders will be 
needed and the ownership of the firm will increasingly disperse.  Analyzing data on 
changes of corporate ownership in Australia, Asjeet Lamba and Geof Stapledon show 
that the longer a company has been listed on the stock exchange, the more likely the 
company is to have a widely held ownership structure.144 
 Nonetheless, the analysis of Brazilian ownership data does not seem to be 
consistent with the life-cycle theory.  As we have seen, most companies with dispersed 
ownership are new entrants on Novo Mercado.  The oldest and the most traditional 
Brazilian firms are concentrated on Bovespa’s Level 1 and the standard market.  These 
firms present very concentrated patterns of corporate control.  Brazilian data also 
corroborate the findings of Claessens, Djankov and Lang, who pointed out that in East 
Asia, especially in Indonesia, Malaysia and Taiwan, older firms tend to have more 
concentrated corporate control.145  This result begs the question on why old firms have 
only migrated to Level 1 and not to the most stringent segments.  In a sense, this shows 
institutional adaptation and stability towards concentration of control.  One explanation 
could be that these firms have other sources of finance like government credit through the 
Brazilian Bank for Social and Economics Development (“BNDES”).  They may also 
have a history of retained earnings so that they can finance themselves, and therefore do 
not need to comply with stricter Novo Mercado rules to get cheaper capital, as new firms 
have been doing.  Besides, the underlying story also shows the preceding role of the 
government in providing capital to captains of industry.   
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 d) Size  
 The size theory provides that smaller corporations tend to remain family 
businesses while larger corporations are more likely to be widely held.146  Several studies 
have identified a negative effect of the firm’s size on the level of concentration of 
shareholding control.  The larger the firm is, a greater dispersion of shareholding control 
it will have.147  Demsetz and Lehn, examining a sample of American firms, found greater 
diffusion of ownership in larger firms.  They noted that the size of the firm, as measured 
by the market value of equity is negatively related to ownership concentration.148  
Claessens, Djankov and Lang have found that family ownership increases the smaller the 
firm is in East Asian countries, especially in Japan.149  Faccio and Land, on the other 
hand, demonstrated that family ownership is less likely for larger firms in Western 
European corporations, particularly in United Kingdom and Sweden.  Large firms are 
more likely to be widely held than smaller firms in their sample.150 Also, Asjeet Lamba 
and Geof Stapledon show that larger firms are less likely to have a controlling 
shareholder in Australia, as they are expected to have issued more shares than smaller 
companies.151 
 This study, on the contrary, finds a positive relation between company size and 
control concentration.  Brazilian data show that the largest Brazilian industrial 
conglomerates are still controlled by families.  They include companies such as Klabin 
SA, Votorantim SA and Gerdau SA that are listed on Level 1.  Smaller firms tend to need 
more capital and therefore have greater incentives to comply with better corporate 
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e) Public or Private Initiative? 
 
At least three conditions are necessary to separate ownership from control.  First, the 
controlling shareholders must decide to exit.  This can be done either by a one-time 
liquidation of their stake in a merger transaction, a public offering, or by selling their 
stakes in stages onto market.152   
Second, there must be demand for the shares.  Investors must expect to receive 
sufficient financial return in exchange of the risk they are assuming.153 
Third, the buyers of the shares must not be inclined to gain control, or otherwise, 
concentrated ownership would persist.154  This can happen in two ways: either the 
purchaser of the control block is a widely held company itself, or the shares are acquired 
by dispersed shareholders in the market. 
This process can suffer from State intervention or be privately driven.  Having a brief 
historical overview on the development of Brazilian markets allows us to assess which 
incentives mattered more to promote ownership dispersion.   Brazil has passed two very 
different phases characterized by strong concern of market players about promoting its 
development.  The first phase was characterized by government initiative beginning in 
the 1960s.  The Brazilian government engaged in many efforts to encourage the growth 
of the stock markets. The main strategy was based on tax incentives.  Scholars have 
already pointed out that tax policy can impact corporate ownership and governance.155  In 
the Brazilian situation, tax breaks help explain why companies went public and why there 
was demand for shares among investors.  The Brazilian government provided a variety of 
tax incentives to market players in order to stimulate the offering and demand of publicly 
traded securities.  Two major sets of tax incentives were enacted,  One was the “open 
capital companies program,” which provided corporations and their shareholders 
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substantial tax benefits if the corporation distributed shares to the public.  The second was 
the “Decree Law 157 Fiscal Investment Funds program,” according to which taxpayers 
could purchase shares of government-approved mutual funds instead of paying taxes that 
were due.  The mutual funds would then use the tax receipts to acquire shares.156 
 Through these programs, taxpayers could deduct a percentage of resources spent 
for the acquisition of securities from their gross incomes.  Trubek explained that Decree 
Law 157 provided “forced saving incentives.”  The taxpayer would make a deposit in 
special mutual investment funds that relieved the taxpayer of her tax liabilities.  The tax 
deposit would then be employed to acquire securities, and the deposit holder would be 
entitled to a tax credit.  After holding shares of the mutual investment funds for a 
specified time, the taxpayer could redeem the fund shares for cash.157 
 The government expected that the primary market would develop as a fund-
raising alternative to private entrepreneurships.158  However, even with the tax incentives, 
the market did not experience a sustainable development, apart from occasional activity 
brought by Decree Law 157 funds.159 
 The government then engaged in efforts to pass law reforms that would provide 
the regulatory framework for market development.  These reforms included the capital 
markets law (Law 6385/76) and the corporations law (Law 6404/76).  Musacchio 
analyzes the resulting outcome of these regulatory systems and concludes that 
shareholder protections did not correlate with stock market development.160  
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  At the end of the 1990s, Brazilian capital markets experienced a severe crisis.161 
Trading activity of Bovespa dropped by 47%,162 and a strong privitization process took 
place.  At the same time, the few placements of shares that occurred have been conducted 
mostly by companies that were listing in the American market.  The trading volume of 
ADRs increased from 0.3% in 1996 to 33% of the trading volume of Bovespa in 2000.163  
Therefore, by the end of the 1990s, one-third of Bovespa’s trading activity had moved to 
the American markets.  With the failure of the market to provide finance for firms, the 
BNDES has become the main source for long-term business finance in Brazil.   
 This situation threatened Bovespa’s existence and caused it to look for 
alternatives that could promote the market.  Private efforts had to overcome the failures 
of the market.  At first, the listing requirements of Bovespa changed.  The rationale 
behind this change recognized that investors’ risk perception had to be reduced.  
Enhancing the confidence of investors in the market would cause share values and 
liquidity to increase and encourage companies to issue new shares and go public.164   
 Bovespa’s special listing segments were originally inspired by the German 
Neuer Market.165  Bovespa’s listing levels provide rights to shareholders in addition to 
those given by law.  These incentives are largely based on voluntary adhesion to stronger 
corporate governance that would produce changes in the internal structure of 
corporations.  In turn, the value of these companies were expected to rise.  This rationale 
therefore contrasts with the previous approach because now companies were expected to 
improve corporate governance in a voluntary way. 
 In its first years, Bovespa’s new listing levels did not experience significant 
adhesions.  Some macroeconomic factors, such as the Argentina’s crisis, the domestic 
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energy crisis that required months of electricity rationing, the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th, 2001, and the uncertainty brought about by the 2002 domestic 
Presidential election, are considered the main factors that generated instability.  They 
produced an increase in the risk measured by investors, inhibiting companies’ decisions 
to go public.166 
 Nonetheless, Bovespa’s strategy was not limited to the new listing segments, as 
one may think.  Bovespa also engaged in a series of efforts and alliances with both 
private and public agents in order to promote market development.  This networking was 
critical to the success of the new listing segments, which depended on the support of 
other important market players.167 
 In 2002 Bovespa passed Resolution 282/02-CA, which established that any new 
listings of public offerings must be conducted at least on Level 1.  Bovespa then heavily 
publicized Novo Mercado’s advantages to businessmen, underwriters, domestic and 
foreign institutional investors, investors in private equity and venture capital.168  
 Bovespa sought support from important private players, public institutions and 
international organizations to promote its new listing segments.  For example, Bovespa 
sought support from the Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (Instituto Brasileiro 
de Governança Corporativa or “IBGC”).  This institute offered many courses and 
lectures on Bovespa’s Novo Mercado.169  Bovespa also sought the support of public 
institutions like the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM) and the agency responsible 
for overseeing Brazilian pension funds (Secretaria de Previdência Complementar).  
These two institutions changed regulations on investment of pension funds.  The changes 
authorized a higher ceiling on stock investments provided that the issuing company was 
listed in Novo Mercado or Level 2.170  The National Association of Investment Banks 
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(Associação Nacional dos Bancos de Investimento or “ANBID”), the Brazilian equivalent 
to the NASD, also provided a key rule: It established that its members could only lead 
offers whose issuers were registered at least on Bovespa’s Level 1.171   The practical 
effect of this rule was that underwriters would be virtually non-existent for offers in the 
traditional market.172    
 In addition, Bovespa sought support from BNDES.  BNDES began granting 
specific incentives for companies to join Novo Mercado.  In some cases, BNDES 
required companies to adhere to Novo Mercado as a financing condition.173  Bovespa also 
relied on the support of the World Bank and OCDE.  The Private Sector Advisory Group 
on Corporate Governance (“PSAG”). coordinated by these institutions, publicized its 
support to Novo Mercado.174  
 This brief description of the Brazilian experience shows that self-regulation by 
stock exchanges, allied with strong support of key market players, was a driving force of 
corporate governance and capital markets enhancement.  The creation of special listing 
segments has provided the first impulse towards an important change in the market.  
  
f) IPO’s Market 
 
 Scholars have argued that the absence of an active IPO market may be a reason 
why ownership does not widely diffuse in certain countries.175  Strong capital markets are 
associated with the entry of new firms.  According to this view, having developed 
secondary markets is not enough to promote overall market development.  Secondary 
market development may be associated with the trading of dual-class shares, which 
generate liquidity but do not allow ownership to separate from control.  Therefore, 
countries with less developed primary markets will be characterized by concentrated 
ownership. 
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Helwege, Pirinsky and Stulz investigate how firms evolved in the US from 1970 
to 2001 to understand why they became widely held.176 Firms generally do not become 
widely held shortly after their IPO.177  They find that about ten years after the IPO, 
insiders owning less than 20% of the cash flow rights controlled half of the firms.  They 
find that firms that have greater financing needs are more likely to become widely held.178  
For primary markets to be strong there should be corporations that need to access finance 
through public security offerings.  Established companies may have other finance 
sources.  If finance is supplied by retained earnings, by bank borrowing or by infusion of 
private capital, firms will not have the need to go through equity offers.179 
 Helwege, Pirinsky and Stulz attribute the changing dynamics of insider 
ownership to stock market variables.  Firms become more widely held when the market 
of their shares is liquid and they can be sold without significant discount.  Demsetz and 
Lehn also argued that a greater price of a fraction of the firm reduces the degree to which 
ownership is concentrated in their sample of American firms.180  
 Indeed Novo Mercado’s developments seem to support these arguments.  Studies 
showed that Novo Mercado’s upsurge listing is indeed associated with the increase in 
price of securities obtained in this segment.181  New corporations with demand for capital 
constrained could find advantageous conditions to access finance, as Novo Mercado 
became an alternative for raising capital, more attractive than the traditional forms of 
borrowing at very large interests rates.  
 The data presented in this paper show that most companies from Novo Mercado 
used to be closely held companies.  Novo Mercado is comprised basically of new 
publicly held companies aiming at obtaining better prices for their IPOs.  Therefore more 
dispersed ownership structure is indeed associated with an increase in IPO activity.182  As 
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we have seen, few companies from the traditional market chose to migrate to Novo 
Mercado.  Older companies maintain high levels of ownership concentration.  
 
g) Decreasing Levels of Private Benefits of Control and Firm Value 
Private benefits of control are considered an important determinant of ownership 
structures.183  Studies have shown that larger levels of private benefits of control are 
increasingly associated with the presence of controlling shareholders.184  
The Brazilian experience with different listing segments allows us to test the relation 
between private benefits of control and ownership structures.  If controlling ownership 
structure is decreasing at Novo Mercado, we might expect that private benefits of control 
have been diminishing as well.  Although we don’t attempt to conduct such analysis here, 
an interesting venue would be to compare the amount of private benefits extraction in all 
the different listing levels to assess whether they correlate with the level of 
concentration/dispersion of ownership achieved in these segments. 
 
h) One Share – One Vote 
  The possibility that the one share-one vote rule become a mandatory European 
Law Rule has reopened a very intense debate.  This debate brings to the European context 
a series of questions and arguments that were made in the United States few decades ago 
in relation to the desirability and the effects generated by the requirement of the one 
share-one vote rule by stock exchanges and the security exchange authority.   
 Several scholars have presented critiques against the adoption of the one share –
one vote rule.185 For instance, it was argued that a mandatory rule could produce backfire 
effects such as inducing companies to adopt pyramidal structures, or derivative 
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instruments that could decompose the effect of such rule.186 
 On the other hand, many scholars have pointed out that deviations from one 
share-one vote may be inefficient.  Grossman and Hart have showed that because the one 
share-one vote protects shareholders’ property rights, value reducing bids are impossible 
under this rule. 187  They have also argued that changes that restrict the voting power may 
harm security-holders.188  Nonetheless, this literature still admits that in specific 
situations, such deviations can be wealth enhancing.189  One example is the initial public 
offering by a company of dual class shares, in which the purchasers would reduce the 
price of the shares so that the company’s initial owners would bear the cost of the 
issuance. 
  Defendants of the one share-one vote argue that capital market development 
requires such arrangement so as to avoid discounts practiced on the value of shares in 
environments characterized by this divergence in voting rights.  The difference between 
control rights and cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholder is usually associated 
with a discount on the value of the shares.   Claessens et al. have shown that this discount 
increases when the wedge between control rights and cash-flow rights is larger.190  They 
show that pyramid schemes, cross-holdings among firms and the issuance of dual-class 
shares are all associated with lower corporate value, although none of these associations 
is statistically significant.191  Nenova focuses her analysis on the effect of dual shares on 
private benefits of control, and she finds that non-voting shares are associated with large 
value discounts.192 
  An increasing number of firms in continental Europe have unifyed dual-
class shares into a single class.  Anete Pajuste presents evidence, based on data of seven 
European countries that widely rely on dual-class share structures, that firm value 
increases after the unification if compared to the firm itself before the unification, 
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compared to other dual-class firms.193  Pedersen and Thomsen have found that the use of 
dual class shares is positively associated with family ownership.  A stronger ownership 
concentration is correlated with the existence of dual class shares in a positive way.194  
  Others have shown that the impact of the one share-one vote depends on the 
underlying existing ownership structure.  In widely-held companies its adoption may 
ensure efficient outcomes in bidding contests meanwhile its deviations may mitigate the 
free rider problem and promote takeovers.  In companies with concentrated ownership, its 
adoption may promote value-increasing control transfers while deviations may exacerbate 
conflicts of interests between the controlling shareholders and the minority 
shareholders.195 
 Scholars have then argued that the one share-one vote could both discourage and 
promote ownership concentration.  Because it ties votes to cash flow rights, it increases 
the financial burden of the shareholder seeking to keep control.  This can bring about two 
opposite effects: the shareholder may relinquish control because it is too expensive or he 
or she can be reluctant of losing control, which may impede the floating of shares and 
perhaps induce a going private transaction.196 
 Bovespa’s special listing requirements seems to support the argument that the 
one share-one vote rule helps to promote the dispersion of ownership.197  This study 
provides evidence that the adoption of the one share – one vote rule is indeed associated 
with a larger diffusion of ownership.  This rule has promoted ownership dispersion, as it 
requires that controlling shareholders reduce their voting power if they want to raise 
significant amount of capital at Novo Mercado.  In the other listing segments that don’t 
require compliance with the one share-one vote rule, alternatively, block holders tend to 
                                                 
193
 Anete Pajuste, Determinants and Consequences of the Unification of Dual-Classes Shares, European 
Central Park, March 2005.  (The author nonetheless considers that dual-class shares should not be 
forbidden justifying this opinion on the need to raise new equities in firms, which are dependent on new 
equity capital). 
194
 Pedersen & Thomsen, supra note 148, at 764, 772. 
195
 Mike C. Burkart & Samuel Lee, The One Share-One Vote Debate: A Theoretical Perspective (ECGI-
Finance Working Paper Group, Paper No. 176/2007, May 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=987486. 
196
 Id. at 31. 
197
 See also Jeffrey Gordon, An International Relations Perspective on the Convergence of Corporate 
Governance: German Shareholder Capitalism and the European Union, 1990-2000 (arguing that the one-
share-one-vote rule fosters the development of dispersed ownership). 
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retain their controlling position and be reluctant to float shares.198 
 
i) Controlling Shareholders Preferences and Incentives 
 Controlling shareholders bear significant costs from maintaining concentration 
of ownership and voting rights.  They incur in costs of holding a nondiversified portfolio, 
costs of the lack of liquidity of their investment and costs from the necessity of 
monitoring the operation of the company, so as to assure that they will derive profits from 
their investment.  Therefore, controlling shareholders benefit by extracting private 
benefits from the corporation in exchange for incurring these costs.199   
 Some level of benefits extraction may be efficient to the corporation and to non-
controlling shareholders as well.  The controlling shareholders may do a better job in 
policing the management of public corporations than what market-oriented techniques 
would achieve in firms with dispersed ownership.  The controlling shareholders have 
lower information costs and have incentives to watch closely what is happening in the 
corporation and, therefore, they may catch earlier problems that would interfere in the 
corporate results.  In this view, controlling shareholders would be an efficient alternative 
to the problem of separating of ownership and control that arise from widely-held 
shareholdings.  They would increase productivity generating gains to non-controlling 
shareholders as well.200  Non-controlling shareholders would actually prefer having 
controlling shareholders controlling the corporation as long as their benefits would 
exceed the costs that they generate to non-controlling shareholders.  Therefore, non-
controlling shareholders would prefer having controlling shareholders manage the 
corporation provided that the gains from the reduction in managerial agency costs are 
                                                 
198
 This is also consistent with Musacchio’s analysis that the concentration of control in Brazilian 
companies was increased after the introduction of non-voting shares in 1932.  See Musacchio, supra note 
162, at 5 and 20.  Musacchio concludes: “ . . . Brazil’s traded corporations had lower concentration of 
control rights, on average, in the past than today.  Before 1910, the three largest shareholders controlled, on 
average, between 50% of shares and around 50% of total votes.”  Id. at 48.  By 2004, the three largest 
shareholders of the largest 20 companies in Brazil held 51.2% of the shares and 76.6% of the votes.  Most 
of this increase in the concentration of control rights should be attributed to the introduction of nonvoting 
preferred shares in 1932, which reduced the cost of controlling a corporation and enabled controlling 
investors to obtain equity finance without sacrificing their control rights.”  Id. at 30 
199
 See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1; and Gilson, Controlling Shareholders, supra note 1, at 1651-1652 
(2006). 
200
 Gilson, Controlling Shareholders, supra note 1, at 1651-1652. 
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superior to the private benefits that controlling shareholders extract.201  This equation is 
what Professors Gilson and Gordon have called “the controlling shareholder trade off.”202 
 Using this framework, a corporate governance system should achieve a positive 
trade off from controlling shareholders structures.  To put it differently, the problem is 
transforming a structure of inefficient controlling shareholders, who were used to extract 
large amounts of private benefits of control, into a structure of efficient controlling 
shareholders, who generated benefits from more focused monitoring that exceedes the 
costs of private benefits extraction.  This would cause minority shareholders to be better 
off from the controlling shareholders’ management, raising the overall level of 
confidence in the capital markets.203 
 Gilson’s hypothesizes that there should be more diversity of shareholding 
distribution among companies in an efficient controlling shareholder system.  He gives as 
example the case of Sweden and Italy, showing that Sweden (a good law nation) has 
considerable more widely held ownership than Italy (a bad law nation), despite the fact 
that both countries are considered controlling shareholders oriented systems.  According 
to Gilson’s hypothesis, inefficient controlling shareholders systems show less diversity of 
shareholding distribution.204   
 Likewise, the fact that we find more diversity in the ownership structure of 
Brazilian corporations today than in a few years ago appears to support the hypothesis 
that controlling shareholders structures have moved to more efficient patterns because of 
relevant changes in the level of shareholder protection and consequent reduction of 
pecuniary private benefits of control.  Investors pay more for Novo Mercado’s shares 
because they consider that the level of pecuniary expropriation they will be subjected to 
is not the same as it used to be.   
 Gilson also distinguishes between pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefits 
of control to explain differences between the incidences of controlling shareholders in 




 Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at __.  Gilson, Controlling Shareholders, supra note 1, at 1641, 1650. 
203
 Gilson, Controlling Shareholders, supra note 1, at 1652. 
204
 Id. at 1659.  
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certain countries.205  Non pecuniary benefits such as social status play an important role in 
Brazil.  High levels of non-pecuniary private benefits of control should decrease the rate 
at which controlling shareholders and their heirs dissipate control.206  This may be an 
important factor to explain why Level 1 companies still persist with very concentrated 
structures of ownership.  Level 1’s companies consist of very traditional Brazilian 
companies, whose controlling shareholders have social status and exert political 
influences. 
 Even if there are evidences that listing on Novo Mercado diminishes the cost of 
capital to companies, pecuniary incentives may not be enough for changing the mind of 
traditional controlling shareholders that still enjoy non-pecuniary advantages from their 
positions.   But it is important to note, that even if social status and political relations are 
considered non-pecuniary private benefits, they may result in gains that can be easily 
translated into pecuniary benefits.  The concentration of corporate control and assets in 
the hands of few families creates the opportunity for them to lobby government agencies 
for special treatment. They can demand preferential public contracts and non-market-
based financing from state banks, which will lead them to weakly rely on equity 
finance.207  Ultimately, families may have a significant influence upon governmental 
economic policy.  This motivation for crony capitalism can also explain why many 
companies still continue to have families as their major controlling shareholders, as it 
happens in Level 1.208  In this framework, changes in ownership structure may be more 
difficult to achieve and require more time to succeed.  Controlling shareholders tastes 
therefore may be more difficult to change if they are not constrained by the need of 
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 Id. at 1665.   
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 Gilson, Controlling Shareholders, supra note 203, at 1666. 
207
 Claessens, Djankov & Lang, supra note 4, at 109. 
208
 See id. at 108-109 (discussing data on concentration of corporate assets that are indicative of crony 
capitalism in East Asia). 
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VIII. THE CHALLENGES THAT THE MARKET WILL FACE 
 
 
 Novo Mercado has achieved 20% of Bovespa’s market capitalization in 8 years.  
This is a very significant change that happened in a considerable fast period of time 
period of time.  For this outcome to be improved, many challenges will have to be faced 
by regulators and market participants.   
 It is still unclear that Bovespa’s legal rules will achieve their desirable 
enforcement.209  Bovespa has established an arbitration panel to circumvent the delay and 
uncertainty of Brazilian courts.  However, up to now, this arbitration panel has never 
been installed and it is unsure whether it is going to work properly in practice. 
 The Brazilian Corporate Law was envisaged based on the figure of the classical 
controlling shareholder.  Brazilian law imposes more responsibilities to controlling 
shareholders, and less so to managers.  However, as ownership structures changes, this 
legal model is challenged.  Many problems that may emerge in companies without clear 
controlling shareholders will present significant difficulties for the current law’s 
framework in place.  For instance, the Brazilian Law affords tag along rights to minority 
shareholders in case of sale of control.  Control transactions usually involved more than 
50% of the voting shares of the corporation.  With the increasing level of ownership 
dispersion, it will be more difficult to assess when a sale of control is taking place.  Is a 
sale of 30% of the voting shares still a control sale?  And what about a sale of 10% of the 
voting shares?  And about 10% of voting shares by a shareholder participating in a 
control shareholder agreement’?210  There is still no clear criteria according to which one 
could solve these questions.  There is a lot of room to opposing arguments.  The 
definition of independent directors, the adoption of shareholders’ agreements that bind 
directors and the use and enforcement of anti-takeover clauses211 raise important 
questions for regulators and market players.  
 Also, many issues are poorly regulated.  One example that brought recent 
attention by the midia has to do with practices of underwriters in the issuance of 
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 Cosan case. 
210
 VCP recent case. 
211
 Totvs case. 
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Departing from a unique vantage point, this paper aims at drawing general 
conclusions from the Brazilian experience of changing patterns of corporate ownership. 
Designing special listing segments with higher standards of corporate governance 
appears to be an important solution for fostering markets stuck in low-level equilibrium 
due to poor protection of minority shareholders and poor corporate governance.  The 
Bovespa experiment has shown that many new companies have chosen to adhere to 
special segments characterized by more stringent corporate governance practices than the 
ones adopted by companies in the standard market.  They are looking for finance in the 
capital markets instead of making use of their usual alternatives (e.g., debt).  So, private 
regulation may work where public regulation has failed to foster market development. 
Nonetheless, this paper cautions that the majority of traditional companies have 
not yet migrated to Bovespa’s new listing segments the way players of the market were 
expecting them to do.  This shows that path dependence still applies:  firms tend to persist 
with their patterns of initial ownership and changes in corporate governance practices that 
depend on changes in ownership structures may remain hard to achieve.   
Brazilian capital markets are going through an important change.  The “new 
entrants” have caused the level of ownership concentration to significantly diminish in 
Novo Mercado.  However this change is accompanied by persistence of the traditional 
concentration of ownership in Level 2, Level 1 and the standard market.  Therefore, we 
find that new practices of corporate governance coexisting with old practices.  We find 
institutional adaptation towards better governance patters, however family ownership is 
still dominant and stable.  
This paper also identifies an important challenge for the corporate governance 
literature in general.  Corporate governance scholars have restricted their research to 
companies’ charters and bylaws.  The analysis of shareholders’ agreements in Brazil 
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points out that the contractual relations that affect corporate governance may be more 
complex than typically expected.  An analysis of Brazilian corporate governance that 
does not take shareholders’ agreements into consideration is certainly incomplete.  
Shareholders’ agreements are central in assessing the concentration of corporate control 
in Brazil.  Whether this also applies to assessing corporate governance in other countries 
is still an open question that deserves more attention from researchers.   
Shareholders’ agreements are used by companies with a larger degree of 
ownership dispersion as mechanisms that coordinate joint control and voting rights.  In 
this sense shareholders’ agreements substitute share ownership.  Furthermore, this 
analysis makes it clear that control comes in forms other than direct or indirect equity 
ownership (pyramids).  It may rely on a contractual basis through a shareholders 
agreement.  In addition, shareholders’ agreements greatly affect how directors can vote, 
making them representatives of shareholders’ interests and largely undermining their 
independence.  
Anti-takeover defenses have been cropping up in companies bylaws, which is a 
remarkable development of increasing dispersion of ownership.  We still have to wait to 
see how they will affect potential attempts of takeover or sales of control.  It is unclear 
whether public regulation will evolve to tackle this phenomenon.  Private actors seem to 
have not yet realized how anti-takeover defenses may adversely affect the development 






         TABLE 1 :  Main Aspects of Bovespa’s Listing Rules 
 










Disclosure of conditions of related party transactions. not required required required required 
Monthly disclosure of transactions with shares of the company by employees, administrators and Fiscal 
Counselors. 
not required required required required 
Disclosure of quantity and characteristics of  securities issued by the company held  by controlling shareholders   
members  of the Board, officers and members  of the Fiscal Counsel.. 
not required required required required 
Improvements in quarterly financial statements, including consolidated financial statements and report of the 
Independent Auditor    
not required required required required 
 The Company’s quarterly and year-end financial statements will include a Cash Flow Statement not required required required required 
Quarterly Statements should be presented in English or prepared in accordance with the US GAAP or IFRS not required not required required required 
Disclosure of annual balance sheet according to standards of US GAAP or IFRS. not required not required required required 
Free-float 
Maintenance of a free-float of at least 25% of the capital. not required required required required 
Capital Dispersion 
Public offerings have to use mechanisms the favor capital dispersion. not required required required required 
Board of Directors  
Establishment of a two-year unified mandate for the entire Board of Directors, which must have five members at 
least, from which at least 20% (twenty percent) shall be Independent Members. 
not required not required required required 
Corporate Rules 
Voting rights granted to preferred shares in circumstances such as incorporation, spin-off and merger and 
approval of contracts between the company and other firms of the same holding group. 
not required not required required not 
applicable 
Obligation to hold a tender offer for acquisition of the shares held by the other shareholders at the economic 
value of the shares 
not required not required required required 
In a sale of control, same conditions provided to majority shareholders will have to be extended to all 
shareholders (Tag Along).  
not required not required not required required 
In case majority shareholders sell their stake, same conditions granted of price must be extended to common 
shareholders, while preferred shareholders must get, at least, 80% of the price (tag along). 
not required not required required not 
applicable 
The company should have a publicly shareholder meeting with analysts and investors, at least once a year.  not required required required required 
Arbitration 
Admission to the Market Arbitration Panel for resolution of corporate disputes. not required  not required required required 
Annual Calendar 
Disclosure of an annual calendar of corporate events. not required required required required 
One Share – One Vote 
The capital stock must be solely represented by common shares (voting shares). not required not required not required required 
Source: author’s elaboration based on Bovespa’s rules
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         TABLE 2 
   Number of Public Companies Listed on Bovespa 
Number of Brazilian public companies listed on the indicated Bovespa levels.  Data is provided 




Bovespa Listing Segments 
  Year Standard Level 1 Level 2 Novo Mercado Total 
1995 577 577 
1996 589 589 
1997 595 595 
1998 599 599 
1999 534 
these levels were created in 
2000 
534 
2000 495 0 0 0 495 
2001 450 18 0 0 468 
2002 407 24 3 2 436 
2003 374 31 3 2 410 
2004 343 33 7 7 390 
2005 316 37 10 18 381 
2006 300 36 14 44 394 
2007  293 44 20 92 449 
    Source: Bovespa (considerado até final de dezembro) 
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        TABLE 3 
   Primary Stock Offerings 
    
STOCKS 
Volume 
YEAR Number of Issuances R$ millions US$ millions 
1995 31 1.935,25 2.111,10 
1996 22 9.142,96 9.168,27 
1997 23 3.599,21 3.655,44 
1998 20 4.112,10 3.494,52 
1999 10 2.749,45 1.467,83 
2000 6 1.410,17 628,24 
2001 6 1.353,30 625,24 
2002 4 1.050,44 370,12 
2003 2 230,00 73,76 
2004 9 4.469,90 1.552,03 
2005 13 4.364,63 1.860,86 
2006 29 13.745,58 6.565,67 
2007 59 33.135,84 17.253,01 
 Source: CVM 
 
 
        TABLE 4 
    Secondary Stock Offerings 
 
Secondary Distributions 
  (Stocks) 
Volume YEAR 
No. of registered 
distributions 
 R$ millions US$ 
millions 
1995 0 0 0 
1996 2 37,9 37,2 
1997 0 0 0 
1998 14 1.856,30 1.618,00 
1999 14 1.866,60 1.065,50 
2000 14 12.127,30 6.726,00 
2001 7 4.308,70 1.768,20 
2002 2 5.096,80 2.158,60 
2003 6 1.856,30 614,40 
2004 12 4.682,30 1.611,60 
2005 15 6.634,60 2.792,20 
2006 30 12.760,80 5.878,70 
2007 44 34.121,3 18.211,4 
  Source: CVM 
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TABLE 5 
               Recent IPOs 
 Statistics of Going Public Transactions in BOVESPA 




Nº of brokers 
 
No. of investors 
investidores 
Tempo Part  Novo Mercado Primary 394 57 N/D 
MPX Energia   Novo Mercado Primary 1.916 58 N/D 
BMF  Novo Mercado Secundary 5.984 70 255.001 
Panamericano Level 1 Primary 680 61 N/D 
Laep BDR Primary 508 52 563 
Helbor Novo Mercado Primary 252 60 723 
Amil Novo Mercado Mixed 1.401 69 4.398 
BR Brokers Novo Mercado Mixed 699 55 13 
Bovespa Hld Novo Mercado Secundary 6.626 69 64.775 
Agrenco BDR Primary 666 55 805 
Marisa Novo Mercado Primary 506 67 13.177 
SEB Level 2 Mixed 413 61 3.709 
Tenda Novo Mercado Primary 603 60 10.172 
Trisul Novo Mercado Primary 330 62 2.444 
BicBanco Level 1 Mixed 822 62 5.197 
Sul America Level 2 Primary 775 67 19.261 
Satipel Novo Mercado Mixed 398 59 - 
Cosan Ltd BDR Primary  275 59 1572 
Estacio Part Level 2 Mixed 447 64 10.890 
Generalshopp Novo Mercado Primary 287 59 4.999 
Multiplan Level 2 Mixed 925 66 24.419 
Providencia Novo Mercado Primary 469 64 11.135 
Springs Novo Mercado Mixed 656 69 7.383 
ABC Brasil Level 2 Mixed 609 49 6.050 
Triunfo Part Novo Mercado Mixed 513 59 7.139 
Guarani Novo Mercado Primary 666 63 12.388 
Kroton Level 2 Mixed 479 60 11.297 
MRV Novo Mercado Mixed 1.193 60 15.657 
Patagonia BDR Mixed 539 56 2.846 
Minerva Novo Mercado Mixed 444 62 11.660 
Invest Tur Novo Mercado Primary 945 53 17 
Redecard Novo Mercado Mixed 4.643 67 29.766 
2007 
Indusval Level 1 Mixed 253 59 290 
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Tegma Novo Mercado Mixed 604 64 6.776 
Marfrig Novo Mercado Primary 1.021 62 4.933 
Daycoval Level 1 Mixed 1.092 62 7.585 
Cruzeiro Sul Level 1 Mixed 574 61 4.221 
EZTec Novo Mercado Primary 542 62 5.553 
Log-In Novo Mercado Mixed 848 67 26.898 
SLC Agricola Novo Mercado Mixed 490 64 9.750 
Parana Level 1 Primary 529 50 8.586 
Inpar S/A Novo Mercado Primary 756 60 9.614 
Tarpon BDR Primary 444 56 10.714 
Sofisa Level 1 Mixed 439 61 7.269 
Wilson Sons BDR Secundary 706 57 11.915 
Cremer Novo Mercado Mixed 508 58 9.419 
Agra Incorp Novo Mercado Mixed 786 62 5.375 
CR2 Novo Mercado Primary 308 58 2.810 
Bematech Novo Mercado Mixed 407 60 8.718 
Metalfrio Novo Mercado Mixed 453 65 9.672 
JHSF Part Novo Mercado Primary 432 66 4.561 
Fer Heringer Novo Mercado Mixed 304 64 9.275 
BR Malls Par Novo Mercado Mixed 657 66 13.909 
Even Novo Mercado Primary 460 65 11.366 
Pine Level 1 Mixed 517 55 20.251 
JBS Novo Mercado Mixed 1.617 61 22.984 
Anhanguera Level 2  Mixed 512 60 13.742 
GVT Holding Novo Mercado Primary 1.076 59 14.597 
Sao Martinho Novo Mercado Mixed 424 64 24.686 
Iguatemi Novo Mercado Primary 549 64 16.889 
Tecnisa Novo Mercado Mixed 791 66 17.436 
CC Des Imob Novo Mercado Mixed 522 63 22.294 
Rodobensimob Novo Mercado Primary 449 62 14.181 
PDG Realt Novo Mercado Mixed 648 62 12.018 
Dufrybras BDR Secundary 880 60 10.177 
Lopes Brasil Novo Mercado Secundary 475 59 9.930 
Positivo Inf Novo Mercado Mixed 604 61 18.814 
Odontoprev Novo Mercado Mixed 522 55 8.860 
Ecodiesel Novo Mercado Primary 379 58 9.446 
2006 
Terna Part Level 2 Mixed 627 52 6.509 
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Profarma Novo Mercado Mixed 401 53 4.609 
Brascan Res Novo Mercado Mixed 1.188 54 4.319 
M.Diasbranco Novo Mercado Secundary 411 56 3.460 
Santos Bras Level 2 Mixed 933 54 4.209 
Klabinsegall Novo Mercado Mixed 527 53 4.720 
Medial Saude Novo Mercado Mixed 742 53 3.131 
Abyara Novo Mercado  Primary 164 41 6 
MMX Miner Novo Mercado  Primary 1.119 35 18 
Datasul Novo Mercado  Mixed  317 52 5.514 
GP Invest BDR  Primary 706 49 2.373 
Lupatech Novo Mercado  Mixed  453 55 11.453 
BrasilAgro Novo Mercado  Primary 583 35 3 
CSU CardSyst Novo Mercado  Mixed  341 57 14.637 
ABnote Novo Mercado  Secundary 480 55 15.453 
Equatorial Level 2 Mixed 540 56 7.521 
Totvs Novo Mercado Mixed 460 57 16.322 
Company Novo Mercado Mixed 282 55 13.166 
Gafisa Novo Mercado Mixed 927 57 14.028 
Copasa Novo Mercado Primary 813 60 15.802 
Vivax Level 2  Mixed 529 50 7.916 
UOL Level 2  Mixed 625 56 13.234 
Cosan Novo Mercado Primary 886 52 9.079 
Nossa Caixa Novo Mercado Secundary 954 54 7.666 
OHL Brasil Novo Mercado  Mixed 496 42 1.084 
Energias BR Novo Mercado Mixed 1.185 44 468 
TAM S/A Level 2  Mixed 548 48 1.212 
Localiza Novo Mercado  Secundary 265 48 809 
Submarino Novo Mercado  Mixed 473 52 4.022 
2005 
Renar Novo Mercado  Primary 16 42 1.698 
Porto Seguro Novo Mercado  Mixed  377 51 5.919 
DASA Novo Mercado  Mixed  437 44 2.892 
Grendene Novo Mercado  Secundary 617 56 7.905 
CPFL Energia Novo Mercado  Mixed  821 47 2.750 
ALL Amer Lat Level 2  Mixed  588 33 3.425 
Gol Level 2  Mixed  878 40 11.397 
2004 
Natura Novo Mercado Secundary 768 32 4.445 
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Source: Bovespa, Dec., 20th 2007, http://www.bovespa.com.br/Principal.asp 
 
* Dados Preliminares 
1. Volume financeiro total da operação 
2. Número de corretoras que participaram do consórcio de distribuição 
3. Número de investidores participantes do varejo (pessoas físicas + clubes de investimento) 
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TABLE 6    
Bovespa’s Segments Market Capitalization 
 
Market Capitalization ($ in millions) of Bovespa’s standard market, Level 1, Level 2 and Novo 
Mercado.  Companies with a majority shareholder have a shareholder that owns more than 50% 
of the voting capital. 
 
 
Market  Capitalization 
Companies with majority 
shareholder 
Companies without a 















Novo Mercado 27 189.048.042.839,36 65 240.244.243.754,94 92 429.292.286.594,30 
Level 2 14 54.079.710.040,99 6 23.798.197.688,22 20 77.877.907.729,21 
Level 1 31 631.755.247.320,61 13 246.945.774.507,31 44 878.701.021.827,92 
Standard 133 793.629.042.667,36 50   129.693.328.935,93 183 923.322.371.603,29 
TOTAL 205 1.668.512.042.868,32 134 640.681.544.886,40 339 2.309.193.587.754,72 






















      Listing History of Companies Listed on Novo Mercado, Level 2 and Level 1 
 




(d /m /y) 








ABYARA PLANEJAMENTO IMOBILIARIO S.A. Construction  Real Estate Construction   24/7/2006 27/7/2006 NO 
AÇÚCAR GUARANI S.A. Food Manufacturing Sugar Manufacturing 20/7/2007 23/7/2007 NO 
AGRA EMPREENDIMENTOS IMOBILIARIOS 
S.A. 
Construction  
Real Estate Construction  19/4/2007 26/4/2007 NO 
AMERICAN BANKNOTE S.A. Finance and Insurance  Credit Card Issuing 12/4/2006 27/4/2006 NO 
AMIL PARTICIPACOES S.A. 
Health 
Medical and Diagnostics 
Services 
24/10/2007  29/10/07 NO 
B2W - COMPANHIA GLOBAL DO VAREJO Retail trade Miscellaneous products 26/7/2007 8/8/2007 NO 
BCO BRASIL S.A. Finance and Insurance Commercial Banking 20/7/1977 28/6/2006 YES_STAND 
BCO NOSSA CAIXA S.A. Finance and Insurance Commercial Banking  14/10/2005 28/10/2005 NO 
BEMATECH IND E COM EQUIP. ELETRONIC 
S.A. 
Manufacturing 
Computer and Computer 
Peripheral Equipment and 
Software Merchant Wholesalers 
17/4/2007 19/4/2007 NO 
BOLSA DE MERCADORIAS E FUTUROS-BMF 
S.A. 
Financial Activities 
Development and Management 
of Trading Systems  
Clearing House Services for 
Securities and Derivative 
Products  
28/11/2007 30/11/2007 NO 
BOVESPA HOLDING S.A. 
Financial Activities 
Holding Company 
Processing, Reserve and 
Clearing House Activities 
23/10/2007 26/10/2007 NO 
BR MALLS PARTICIPACOES S.A. 
Real Estate and Rental and 
Leasing 
Holding Company 
4/1/2006 5/4/2007 NO 
BRASCAN RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES S.A. 
Construction 
Offices of Other Holding 
Companies  
11/9/2006 23/10/2006 NO 
BRASIL BROKERS PARTICIPACOES S.A. 
Construction  
Real Estate Construction 
Real Estate Agents and Brokers 
Real Estate Holdings 
26/10/2007 29/10/2007 NO 
BRASIL ECODIESEL IND COM 
BIO.OL.VEG.S.A. 
Grain and Oilseed Milling 9/11/2006 22/11/2006 NO 
BRASILAGRO - CIA BRAS DE PROP 
AGRICOLAS 
Real Estate and Rental and 
Leasing 
Agriculture business 
25/4/2006 2/5/2006 NO 
CAMARGO CORREA DESENV. IMOBILIARIO 
S.A. 
Construction 
Real Estate Construction  29/1/2007 31/1/2007 NO 
CIA BRAS DESENV. IMOBILIARIO TURISTICO 
Insurance and Finance 
Real Estate and Rental and 
Leasing 
 
12/7/2007 16/07/2007 NO 
CIA CONCESSÕES RODOVIÁRIAS 
Highway, Street, and Bridge 
Construction 
Holding Company 
19/12/2000 01/02/2002 NO 
CIA. HERING 
Textile Mills 
Clothing and apparel 
manufacturing 
20/07/1977 
26/1/2005 16/5/2007 YES_STAND 
CIA. PROVIDÊNCIA INDÚSTRIA E COMÉRCIO Plastics Pipe, Pipe Fitting, and 25/7/2007 27/7/2007 NO 
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Unlaminated Profile Shape 
Manufacturing  
Commercial and manufacturing 
CIA SANEAMENTO BASICO EST SAO PAULO 
Administration of Air and Water 
Resource and Solid Waste 
Management Programs 
Water and Sewer Line and 
Related Structures Construction  
27/6/1994 24/4/2002 YES_STAND 
CIA SANEAMENTO DE MINAS GERAIS-
COPASA MG 
Administration of Air and Water 
Resource and Solid Waste 
Management Programs 
Water and Sewer Line and 
Related Structures Construction 
17/9/2003 8/2/2006 NO 
 
COMPANY S.A. Construction  Real Estate Construction 3/9/2001 2/3/2006 NO 
CONSTRUTORA TENDA S.A. 
Construction  
Real Estate Construction  
Incorporation, Management, 
Real Estate Trading 
11/10/2007 15/10/2007 NO 
COSAN S.A. INDUSTRIA E COMERCIO Food Manufacturing Sugar Manufacturing 26/10/2005 18/11/2005 NO 
CPFL ENERGIA S.A. 
Power and Communication Line 
and Related Structures 
Construction 
Holdings 
18/5/2000 29/9/2004 YES_STAND 
CR2 EMPREENDIMENTOS IMOBILIARIOS 
S.A. 
Construction  
Real Estate Construction 16/4/2007 23/4/2007 NO 
CREMER S.A. Medical, and Hospital Supplies Manufacturing 30/6/2006 30/4/2007 NO 
CSU CARDSYSTEM S.A. Finance and Insurance  Credit Card Issuing 25/4/2006 2/5/2006 NO 
CYRELA COMMERCIAL PROPERT S.A. EMPR 
PART 
Commercial and Industrial 
Buildings Rental 
Shopping centers, warehouses 
1/8/2007 9/8/2007 NO 
CYRELA BRAZIL REALTY S.A.EMPREEND E 
PART 
Construction  
Real Estate Construction 7/7/1994 21/9/2005 NO 
DATASUL S.A. 
Computer and Computer 
Peripheral Equipment and 
Software Merchant Wholesalers 
30/5/2006 2/6/2006 NO 
DIAGNOSTICOS DA AMERICA S.A. Medical and Diagnostic Laboratories 5/11/2004 19/11/2004 NO 
DROGASIL S.A. Drugs and Druggists' Sundries Merchant Wholesalers 20/7/1977 3/7/2007 YES_STAND 
EDP - ENERGIAS DO BRASIL S.A. 
Power and Communication Line 
and Related Structures 
Construction 
Holdings 
5/7/2005 13/7/2005 NO 
EMBRAER-EMPRESA BRAS DE 
AERONAUTICA S.A. 
Aircraft Manufacturing 
Aircraft Engine and Engine Parts 
Manufacturing 
23/5/2006 6/6/2006 NO 
ETERNIT S.A. Cement and Concrete Product Manufacturing and Wholesaler 17/11/1970* 17/8/2006 YES_STAND 
EVEN CONSTRUTORA E INCORPORADORA 
S.A. 
Construction 
Real Estate Construction  2/3/2007 2/4/2007 NO 
EZ TEC EMPREEND. E PARTICIPACOES S.A. Construction 15/6/2007 22/6/2007 NO 
FERTILIZANTES HERINGER S.A. Fertilizer Manufacturing and Wholesaler 10/4/2007 12/4/2007 NO 
GAFISA S.A. Real Estate Property Managers Residential Properties 21/2/1997 17/2/2006 NO 
GENERAL SHOPPING BRASIL S.A. 
Management of Companies and 
Enterprises 
Management of Shopping 
Centers 
26/7/2007 30/7/2007 NO 
GRENDENE S.A. 
Footwear Manufacturing 
Rubber and Plastics Footwear 
Manufacturing 
26/10/2004 29/10/2004 NO 




9/6/2006 15/2/2007 NO 
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Holdings 
HELBOR EMPREENDIMENTOS S.A. 
Real Estate Incorporation, 
Management, and Trading. 
Activities Related to Real Estate 
Real Estate Agents and Brokers. 
09/07/2007 29/10/2007 NO 
IGUATEMI EMPRESA DE SHOPPING 
CENTERS S.A 
Property Managers 
Management Shopping Centers  2/2/2007 7/2/2007 NO 
INDUSTRIAS ROMI S.A. Industrial Machinery Manufacturing 19/4/1938* 23/3/2007 YES_STAND 
INPAR S.A. Construction Real Estate Construction 23/5/2007 6/6/2007 NO 
JBS S.A. 
Meat and Meat Product 
Merchant Wholesalers 
Livestock Merchant Wholesalers 
27/3/2007 29/3/2007 NO 
JHSF PARTICIPACOES S.A. Construction Real Estate Construction 4/4/2007 12/4/2007 NO 
KLABIN SEGALL S.A. Construction Real Estate Construction 14/8/2006 9/10/2006 NO 
LIGHT S.A. 
Power and Communication Line 
and Related Structures 
Construction 
Holdings 
25/11/1968* 22/02/2006 YES_STAND 
LOCALIZA RENT A CAR S.A. Passenger Car Rental 6/5/2005 23/5/2005 NO 
LOG-IN LOGISTICA INTERMODAL S.A. Water transportation 4/6/2007 21/6/2007 NO 
LOJAS RENNER S.A. Department Stores   20/7/1977 1/7/2005 YES_STAND 
LPS BRASIL - CONSULTORIA DE IMOVEIS 
S.A. 
Construction 
Real Estate Construction 12/12/2006 18/12/2006 NO 
LUPATECH S.A. Industrial Machinery and Equipment 8/5/2006 15/5/2006 NO 
M.DIAS BRANCO S.A. IND COM DE 
ALIMENTOS 
Food Manufacturing  11/10/2006 18/10/2006 NO 
MARFRIG FRIGORIFICOS E COM DE ALIM 
S.A. 
Meat and Meat Product 18/6/2007 29/6/2007 NO 
MARISA S.A. Textile, Apparel and Footwear Holding Company 13/06/2007 22/10/2007 NO 
MRV ENGENHARIA E PARTICIPACOES S.A. Engineering Services 13/7/2007 23/7/2007 NO 
MEDIAL SAUDE S.A. Medical and Diagnostic Services  19/6/2006 28/9/2006 NO 
METALFRIO SOLUTIONS S.A. Household Refrigerator and Home Freezer Manufacturing 10/4/2007 13/4/2007 NO 
MINERVA S.A. Meat and Meat Product Merchant Wholesalers 18/7/2007 20/7/2007 NO 
MMX MINERACAO E METALICOS S.A. Mining (except Oil and Gas) Holdings 10/11/1998 24/7/2006 NO 
MPX ENERGIA S.A. Electric Power Holding Company 07/12/2007 14/12/2007 NO 
NATURA COSMETICOS S.A. 
Cosmetics, Beauty Supplies, and 
Perfume Wholesalers 
 
21/5/2004 26/5/2004 NO 
OBRASCON HUARTE LAIN BRASIL S.A. Construction Management public service 6/7/2005 15/7/2005 NO 
ODONTOPREV S.A. Health Care Plans Dental services  13/6/2006 1/12/2006 NO 
PDG REALTY S.A. EMPREEND E 
PARTICIPACOES 
Construction 
Real Estate Construction 23/1/2007 26/1/2007 NO 
PERDIGAO S.A. Meat and Meat Product 24/6/1997* 12/4/2006 YES_STAND 
PORTO SEGURO S.A. 
Insurance 
Health and Welfare Funds 
Holdings 
28/11/1997 22/11/2004 NO 
POSITIVO INFORMATICA S.A. Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 6/12/2006 11/12/2006 NO 
PROFARMA DISTRIB PROD 
FARMACEUTICOS S.A. 
Drugs and Druggists' Sundries 
Merchant Wholesalers 24/10/2006 26/10/2006 NO 
REDECARD S.A. 
Financial Transactions 
Processing, Reserve, and 
Clearinghouse Activities 
11/7/2007 13/7/2007 NO 
RENAR MACAS S.A. Apple Orchards 28/12/2004 28/2/2005 NO 
RODOBENS NEGOCIOS IMOBILIARIOS S.A. Construction 18/1/2007 31/1/2007 NO 
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Real Estate Construction 
 
ROSSI RESIDENCIAL S.A. Construction Real Estate Construction 1/7/1997 27/1/2006 YES_STAND 
SAO CARLOS EMPREEND E PARTICIPACOES 
S.A. 
Management, Rental, Selling 
and Purchase of Commercial 
Property 
25/3/1991 14/12/2006 YES_STAND 
SAO MARTINHO S.A. Sugar and Ethanol (Alcohol) Manufacturing 7/2/2007 12/2/2007 NO 
SATIPEL INDUSTRIAL S.A. Paper and Paper Product Merchant Wholesalers 10/09/2007 21/09/2007 NO 
SLC AGRICOLA S.A. Corn, Cotton Manufacturing and Soybeans and Coffee Processing 12/6/2007 15/6/2007 NO 
SPRINGS GLOBAL PARTICIPACOES S.A. Textile and Fabric Finishing Mills 25/7/2007 27/7/2007 NO 
TECNISA S.A. Construction Holding 9/1/2007 1/2/2007 NO 
TEGMA GESTAO LOGISTICA S.A. Highway, Street, and Bridge Construction 28/6/2007 3/7/2007 NO 
TEMPO PARTICIPACOES S.A. 
Healthcare 
Hospital, Medical and 
Diagnostics Services 
Holding Company 
04/01/2006 18/12/2007 NO 
TPI - TRIUNFO PARTICIP. E INVEST. S.A. 
Other Support Activities for 
Road Transportation 
Management 
5/12/2002 23/7/2007 NO 
TOTVS S.A. Computer Systems Design and Related Services 7/3/2006 9/3/2006 NO 
TRACTEBEL ENERGIA S.A. Electric Power Generation 28/5/1998 16/11/2005 YES_STAND 
TRISUL S.A. 
Construction  
Real Estate Construction  
Electric Power Generation and 
Distribution 
10/10/2007 15/10/2007 NO 
WEG S.A. Motor Manufacturing Holding 9/2/1982 22/7/2007 YES_STAND 
 
 
Company´s name Sector Classification Date of 
CVM 
Register 
(d /m /y) 












Holdings 8/6/2001 12/3/2007 NO 
BCO ABC BRASIL S.A. Banking services 23/7/2007 25/7/2007 NO 
CENTRAIS ELET DE SANTA CATARINA S.A. 
Power and Communication Line 
and Related Structures 
Construction 
Holdings 
26/3/1973* 26/6/2002 YES_STAND 
ELETROPAULO METROP. ELET. SAO PAULO 
S.A. 
Power and Communication Line 
and Related Structures 
Construction 
Public service facilities 
19/8/1993 13/12/2004 YES_STAND 
EQUATORIAL ENERGIA S.A. 
Power and Communication Line 
and Related Structures 
Construction 
Holdings 
30/3/2006 3/4/2006 NO 
ESTACIO PARTICIPACOES S.A. Educational Services Holdings 26/7/2007 30/7/2007 NO 
GOL LINHAS AEREAS INTELIGENTES S.A. 
Scheduled Passenger Air 
Transportation 
Management and Holdings 
9/6/2004 24/6/2004 NO 
KROTON EDUCACIONAL S.A. Educational Services Holdings 1/12/1998 23/07/2007 NO 
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MARCOPOLO S.A. Bus and Other Motor Vehicle Transit Systems 20/7/1977 03/09/2002 YES_STAND 
MULTIPLAN - EMPREEND IMOBILIARIOS 
S.A. 
Real Estate and Management of 
Shopping Centers 25/7/2007 27/7/2007 NO 
NET SERVICOS DE COMUNICACAO S.A. 
Television Broadcasting 
Cable and Other Subscription 
Programming 
22/11/1994 27/06/2002 YES_STAND 
SANTOS BRASIL PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A. Metal Container Logistics  Seaport 16/9/1997 13/10/2006 NO 
SARAIVA S.A. LIVREIROS EDITORES Books Printing Books Seller 20/7/1977 7/4/2006 YES_STAND 
SEB - SISTEMA EDUCACIONAL BRASILEIRO 
S.A 
Educational Services 
Holdings 09/11/1998 18/10/2007 NO 
SUL AMERICA S.A. 
Insurance 
Offices of Other Holding 
Companies 
03/10/2007 05/10/2007 NO 
SUZANO PETROQUIMICA S.A. Petrochemical Manufacturing 25/3/2002 25/11/2004 YES_STAND 
TAM S.A. Passenger Air Transportation Goods Air Transportation 8/8/1997 14/6/2005 YES_STAND 
TERNA PARTICIPACOES S.A. 
Power and Communication Line 
and Related Structures 
Construction 
Holdings 
6/9/2006 27/10/2006 NO 
UNIVERSO ONLINE S.A. Broadcasting Internet Internet Providers 14/12/2005 16/12/2005 NO 
 
Company´s name Sector Classification Date of 
CVM 
Register 
(d /m /y) 








ARACRUZ CELULOSE S.A. Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Mills 5/2/1980 16/4/2002 YES_STAND 
BCO BRADESCO S.A. Commercial banking 20/7/1977 26/6/2001 YES_STAND 
BCO CRUZEIRO DO SUL S.A. Banking services 13/6/2007 26/6/2007 NO 
BCO DAYCOVAL S.A. Finance Activities Banking services 27/6/2007 29/6/2007 NO 
BCO ESTADO DO RIO GRANDE DO SUL S.A. Banking services  20/7/1977 31/7/2007 YES_STAND 
BCO INDUSTRIAL E COMERCIAL S.A. Banking Services Investment Bank 17/09/2007 15/10/2007 NO 
BCO INDUSVAL S.A. Finance Activities 10/7/2007 12/7/2007 NO 
BCO ITAU HOLDING FINANCEIRA S.A. Banking services  No date 26/6/2001 YES_STAND 
BCO PANAMERICANO S.A. 
Banking Services  
Investment and Commercial 
Bank 
12/11/2007 19/11/2007 NO 
PARANAPANEMA S.A. 
Primary Metal Manufacturing 
Cooper Goods 
Holding 
20/07/1977 03/12/2007 YES_STAND 
BCO PINE S.A. Investment Bank 27/3/2007 2/4/2007 NO 
BCO SOFISA S.A. Commercial Credit 26/4/2007 2/5/2007 NO 
BRADESPAR S.A. Investments Holding 7/8/2000 26/6/2001 NO 




19/8/1998 9/5/2002 YES_STAND 
BRASIL TELECOM S.A. 
Telecommunications 
Wired Telecommunications 
Carriers   
27/3/1980 9/5/2002 YES_STAND 
BRASKEM S.A. Petrochemical Manufacturing Basic Chemical Manufacturing 18/12/1978 13/2/2003 YES_STAND 
CENTRAIS ELET BRAS S.A. - ELETROBRAS 
Power and Communication Line 
and Related Structures 
Construction 
28/1/1971 29/9/2006 YES_STAND 
CESP – CIA ENERGETICA DE SAO PAULO 
Power and Communication Line 
and Related Structures 
Construction 
27/9/1971 28/7/2006 YES_STAND 
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Commercial 
CIA BRASILEIRA DE DISTRIBUICAO Food Retailer 4/4/1995 23/4/2003 YES_STAND 
CIA ENERGETICA DE MINAS GERAIS - 
CEMIG 
Power and Communication Line 
and Related Structures 
Construction 
30/6/1971 17/10/2001 YES_STAND 
CIA FIACAO TECIDOS CEDRO CACHOEIRA Textile and Fabric Finishing Mills 11/8/1969 2/10/2003 YES_STAND 
CIA TRANSMISSAO ENERGIA ELET 
PAULISTA 
Power Generation 
Power Transmission  14/7/1999 18/9/2002 YES_STAND 
CIA VALE DO RIO DOCE Iron Ore Mining Iron Processing 2/1/1970 12/12/2003 YES_STAND 
CONFAB INDUSTRIAL S.A. Primary Metal Manufacturing 21/8/1980 19/12/2003 YES_STAND 
DURATEX S.A. Wood Product Manufacturing 26/4/1966 05/05/2005 YES_STAND 
FRAS-LE S.A. Vehicle Parts Manufacturing 20/7/1977 11/11/2004 YES_STAND 
GERDAU S.A. Primary Metal Manufacturing 3/9/1980 26/6/2001 YES_STAND 
IOCHPE MAXION S.A. Vehicle Parts Manufacturing Rail Trailer Parts Manufacturing 17/7/1984 10/11/2005 YES_STAND 
ITAUSA INVESTIMENTOS ITAU S.A. Finances Banking services and Holdings 20/7/1977 26/6/2001 YES_STAND 
KLABIN S.A. Wood Product Manufacturing Forestry and Logging 6/8/1997 10/12/2002 YES_STAND 
MANGELS INDUSTRIAL S.A. Primary Metal Manufacturing 28/12/1971 21/3/2003 YES_STAND 
METALURGICA GERDAU S.A. Primary Metal Manufacturing Management and Holdings 17/5/1968 25/6/2003 YES_STAND 
PARANA BCO S.A. Finance Banking services 11/6/2007 14/6/2007 NO 
RANDON S.A. IMPLEMENTOS E 
PARTICIPACOES 
Vehicle Parts Manufacturing 5/2/1993 26/6/2001 YES_STAND 
S.A. FABRICA DE PRODS ALIMENTICIOS 
VIGOR 
Food Manufacturing 
Dairy Products 21/2/1984 4/10/2001 YES_STAND 
SADIA S.A. Meat and Meat Product Merchant Wholesalers 27/12/2000 26/6/2003 YES_STAND 
SAO PAULO ALPARGATAS S.A. Rubber and Plastics Footwear Manufacturing 20/7/1977 15/7/2003 YES_STAND 
SUZANO PAPEL E CELULOSE S.A. 
Paper and Paper Product 
Woods 
Paper Mills 
15/4/1992 8/5/2003 YES_STAND 
ULTRAPAR PARTICIPACOES S.A. Commercial and Industrial Holdings 27/9/1999 27/10/2005 YES_STAND 




24/1/1995 26/6/2001 YES_STAND 
UNIBANCO UNIAO DE BCOS BRASILEIROS 
S.A. 
Finances 
Investment bank 20/7/1977 26/6/2001 YES_STAND 
UNIPAR UNIAO DE IND PETROQ S.A. Petrochemical Manufacturing 8/12/1971 24/11/2004 YES_STAND 
USINAS SID DE MINAS GERAIS S.A.-USIMINAS Primary Metal Manufacturing  Laminated Plans 11/04/1994 11/10/2007 YES_STAND 
VOTORANTIM CELULOSE E PAPEL S.A. 
Paper and Paper Product 
Woods 
Paper Mills 
2/6/1986 14/11/2001 YES_STAND 




     TABLE 8 
Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed on Novo Mercado. 
A company with a majority shareholder is one that a single shareholder has more than 50% of 
the voting capital.  Some of the companies may present fewer than 3 or 5 largest shareholders, 
and in these cases they are dropped from this classification.   
   
NOVO MERCADO  
Companies with controlling 
shareholder (27)* 
Companies without a controlling 
shareholder (65) 




























Largest 60,87% 0,00 60,87% 26,23% 0,00 26,23% 36,39% 0,00 36,39% 
3 Largest 70,40% 0,00 70,40% 47,28% 0,00 47,28% 52,38% 0,00 52,38% 
5 Largest 70,91% 0,00 70,91% 54,73% 0,00 54,73% 56,16% 0,00 56,16% 
Source: Author’s calculations are based on ownership information available on the CVM website and Annual 
Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 and updated in 2007, except for company MPX whose ownership data 












Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed on Level 2. 
A company with a majority shareholder is one that a single shareholder has more than 50% of 
the voting capital. Some of the companies may present fewer than 3 or 5 largest shareholders, 
and in these cases they are dropped from this classification. 
 
LEVEL 2 
Companies with controlling 
shareholder (14) 
Companies without a controlling 
shareholder (6) 




























Largest 75,91% 19,93% 48,83% 38,84% 15,88% 26,45% 64,79% 18,72% 42,11% 
3 Largest 96,08% 24,21% 52,28% 65,56% 18,52% 39,52% 83,87% 21,93% 47,18% 
5 Largest 97,93% 33,20% 59,21% 82,10% 30,08% 52,12% 91,60% 31,95% 56,37% 
Source: Author’s calculations are based on ownership information available on the CVM website and Annual 
Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 and updated in 2007. 
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     TABLE 10 
Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed on Level 1. 
A company with a majority shareholder is one that a single shareholder has more than 50% of 
the voting capital.  Some of the companies may present fewer than 3 or 5 largest shareholders, 
and in these cases they are dropped from this classification.  
 
LEVEL 1 
Companies with controlling 
shareholder (31) 
Companies without controlling 
shareholder (13) 




























Largest 76,07% 8,13% 39,33% 32,31% 4,72% 19,27% 63,14% 7,12% 33,40% 
3 Largest 89,27% 20,76% 53,35% 64,20% 6,36% 35,42% 81,14% 16,09% 47,54% 
5 Largest 92,75% 34,16% 63,15% 76,83% 16,01% 47,60% 84,79% 25,08% 55,37% 
Source: Author’s calculations are based on ownership information available on the CVM website and Annual 










     TABLE 11 
Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed on the standard market. 
A company with a majority shareholder is one that a single shareholder has more than 50% of 
the voting capital.  Some companies may present fewer than 3 or 5 largest shareholders, and in 
these cases they are dropped from this classification. 
 
STANDARD 
Companies with controlling 
shareholder (133) 
Companies without controlling 
shareholder (50) 




























Largest 77,48% 27,00% 58,58% 33,62% 11,15% 24,42% 65,50% 22,65% 49,23% 
3 Largest 89,72% 43,31% 69,78% 67,64% 26,51% 51,57% 81,64% 37,30% 63,06% 
5 Largest 92,22% 47,20% 71,25% 78,80% 37,42% 66,18% 85,19% 42,31% 68,64% 
Source: Author’s calculations are based on ownership information available on the CVM website.   Annual 
Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 and updated in 2007. 
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KLABIN S.A BNDESPAR 
Monteiro 
Aranha S.A. Niblak  
20,03 
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DIAGRAM 1: ABBREVIATIONS 
 
o JKL - JACOB KLABIN LAFER ADM. E PART. S.A.  
o MLP - MIGUEL LAFER PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.   
o VFV - VFV PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.  
o PRESH - PRESH S.A.  
o GL - GL S.A. PARTICIPAÇÕES  
o GLIND - GLIMDAS PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.  
o DARO - DARO PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.  
o DAWOJOBE - DAWOJOBE PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.  
o ESLI - ESLI PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.  
o LKL - LKL PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.  
o Bradesc Seguro - BRADESCO SEGUROS S/A  
o Banco Bradesc - BANCO BRADESCO S/A  
o Cidade de Deus - CIDADE DE DEUS CIA.CIAL DE PARTIC.  
o Nova Cidade - NOVA CIDADE DE DEUS PARTICIPAÇÕES S/A  
o Fundaç Bradesc - FUNDAÇÃO BRADESCO  
o ELO - ELO PARTICIPAÇÕES S/A  
o Caixa Func. Br- CAIXA BENEF. FUNCIONÁRIOS DO BRADESCO  
o Bco Bilbao - BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA S/A  
o Bco (ES) - BANCO ESPÍRITO SANTO S/A  
o SOC. Ltda - SOC. TÉCNICA MONTEIRO ARANHA LTDA.  
o Euroamerican - EUROAMERICAN FINANCE CORPORATION  
o AMC Part. - AMC PARTICIPAÇÕES S/C LTDA.  
o CJMC Part - CEJMC PARTICIPAÇÕES S/C LTDA.  
o SAMC Part - SAMC PARTICIPAÇÕES S/C LTDA.  
o NIBLAK - NIBLAK PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.  
o KL - KL PARTICIPAÇÕES LTDA.  
o GL - GL S.A. PARTICIPAÇÕES  
o KLA - KLA RO PARTICIPAÇÕES LTDA.  
o DARO - DARO PARTICIPAÇÕES S/A  
o DAWOJOBE - DAWOJOBE PARTICIPAÇÕES S/A  
o MEKLA - MEKLA DELTA PARTICIPAÇÕES LTDA.  




Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed at Novo Mercado accounting for 
shareholders’ agreement. 
A company with a majority shareholder is one that a single shareholder has more than 50% of 
the voting capital.   
 
NEW MARKET 
Companies with a controlling 
shareholder (27) 
Companies without a controlling 
shareholder (65) 
Total Sample (92) 
Shareholder voting capital (mean) Shareholder voting capital (mean) Shareholder voting capital (mean) 
Largest 60,87 Largest 26,23 Largest 36,39 
Companies with a controlling 
shareholder taking into account 
shareholders’ agreements (47) 
Companies without a controlling 
shareholder taking into account 
shareholders’ agreements (45) 
Total Sample taking into account 
shareholders’ agreements (92) 
Shareholder voting capital (mean) Shareholder voting capital (mean) Shareholder voting capital (mean) 
Largest Shareholders 





Companies that ended up with a controlling shareholder taking into account shareholders’ agreements  
Shareholder No. of 
firms 
voting capital not taking into account shareholder 
agreements   (mean) 
voting capital taking into account shareholder 
agreements (mean) 
Largest Shareholders 
Block 20 28,06 65,27 






Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed on Level 2 accounting for shareholders’ 
agreement. 
A company with a majority shareholder is one that a single shareholder has more than 50% of 
the voting capital. 
 
LEVEL 2 
Companies with a controlling 
shareholder (14) 
Companies without a controlling 
shareholder (6) 
Total Sample (20) 
Shareholder voting capital (mean) Shareholder voting capital (mean) Shareholder voting capital (mean) 
Largest 75,91 Largest 38,84 Largest 64,79 
Companies with a controlling 
shareholder taking into account 
shareholders’ agreements (18) 
Companies without a controlling 
shareholder taking into account 
shareholders’ agreements (2)  
Total Sample taking into account 
shareholders’ agreements (20) 
Shareholder voting capital (mean) Shareholder voting capital (mean) Shareholder voting capital (mean) 
Largest Shareholders 
Block  72,19 
Largest Shareholders 
Block  46,29 
Largest Shareholders 
Block  69,60 
Companies that ended up with a controlling shareholder taking into account shareholder agreements  
Shareholder No. of 
firms 
voting capital not taking into account shareholder 
agreements   (mean) 
voting capital taking into account shareholder 
agreements (mean) 
Largest Shareholders 
Block  4 35,11 55,86 
 









Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed on Level 1 accounting for shareholders’ 
agreement. 
A company with a majority shareholder is one that a single shareholder has more than 50% of 
the voting capital. 
 
LEVEL 1 
Companies with a controlling 
shareholder (31) 
Companies without a controlling 
shareholder (13) 
Total Sample (44) 
Shareholder voting capital (mean) Shareholder voting capital (mean) Shareholder voting capital (mean) 
Largest 76,07 Largest 31,26 Largest 63,14 
Companies with a controlling 
shareholder taking into account 
shareholders’ agreements (40) 
Companies without a controlling 
shareholder taking into account 
shareholders’ agreements (3) * 
Total Sample taking into account 
shareholders’ agreements (43)* 
Shareholder voting capital (mean) Shareholder voting capital (mean) Shareholder voting capital (mean) 
Largest Shareholders 
Block  74,99 
Largest Shareholders 
Block  42,94 
Largest Shareholders 
Block  72,75 
Companies that ended up with a controlling shareholder taking into account shareholders’ agreements (9) 
Shareholder No. of 
firms 
voting capital not taking into account shareholder 
agreements (mean) 
voting capital taking into account shareholder 
agreements (mean) 
Largest Shareholders 
Block  9 27,00 70,09 






Composition of Controlling Groups and Largest Shareholders in Novo Mercado 
NEW MARKET (92) 
Companies with controlling shareholders (27) 


























Institutional  0 0 0 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 
Foreign  1 52,06 52,06 2 64,29 64,29 3 60,21 60,21 
Individual or 
family  
3 62,82 62,82 17 61,89 54,37 20 62,03 55,64 
Government 4 60,83 60,83 0 0 0 4 60,83 60,83 
Companies without controlling shareholders (65) 


























Institutional  4 9,95 9,95 2 37,52 18,09 6 19,14 12,66 
Foreign  17 22,40 22,40 4 22,45 22,45 21 22,41 22,41 
Individual or 
family  
9 23,01 23,01 28 37,07 33,29 37 33,65 30,79 
Government 1 49,50 49,50 0 0 0 1 49,50 49,50 
Companies with and without  controlling shareholders (92) 


























Institutional  4 9,95 9,95 2 37,52 18,09 6 19,14 12,66 
Foreign  18 24,05 24,05 6 36,40 36,40 24 27,14 27,14 
Individual or 
family  
12 32,96 32,96 45 46,44 41,26 57 43,61 39,51 
Government 5 58,56 58,56 0 0 0 5 58,56 58,56 
 




 Composition of Controlling Groups, Largest Shareholders and Market Capitalization 
 in the Novo Mercado 
Market capitalization is reported in R$ millions. 
 
Novo Mercado 
Companies with controlling 
shareholders (27) 
Companies without controlling 
shareholders (65) 
Total Sample (92) 
Shareholder 













Institutional 0 0,00 0,00 6 64.746.363.054,48 26,95 6 64.746.363.054,48 15,08 
Foreign 3 17.096.422.523,52 9,04 21 76.726.010.803,99 31,94 24 93.822.433.327,51 21,86 
Individual or family 20 77.545.682.907,49 41,02 37 93.115.605.752,27 38,76 57 170.661.288.659,76 39,75 
Government 4 94.405.937.408,35 49,94 1 5.656.264.144,20 2,35 5 100.062.201.552,55 23,31 
TOTAL 27 189.048.042.839,36 100 65 240.244.243.754,94 100 92 429.292.286.594,30 100 




Composition of Controlling Groups and Largest Shareholders in Level 2 
LEVEL 2 (20) 
Companies with controlling shareholders (14) 


























Institutional  0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0 0 
Foreign  3 75,39 50,79 1 61,34 6,34 4 71,88 39,68 
Individual or 
family  
2 92,48 71,10 6 80,02 48,60 8 83,13 54,22 
Government 1 50,18 20,20 1 70,02 16,38 2 60,10 16,38 
Companies without controlling shareholders (6) 


























Institutional  0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 
Foreign  1 32,78 26,98 0 0,00 0,00 1 32,78 26,98 
Individual or 
family  
2 44,20 15,79 3 45,80 25,59 5 45,16 21,67 
Government 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 
Companies with and without  controlling shareholders (20) 


























Institutional  0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 
Foreign  4 64,74 44,84 1 61,34 6,34 5 64,06 37,14 
Individual or 
family  
4 68,34 43,44 9 68,61 40,93 13 68,53 41,70 
Government 1 50,18 20,20 1 70,02 16,38 2 60,10 18,29 





Composition of Controlling Groups, Largest Shareholders and Market Capitalization in the Level 2 
Market capitalization is reported in R$ millions. 
 
LEVEL 2 
Companies with controlling 
shareholders (14) 
Companies without controlling 
shareholders (6) 
Total Sample (20) 
Shareholder 













Institutional 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 
Foreign 4 13.164.547.105,35 24,34 1 3.281.505.350,79 13,79 5 16.446.052.456,14 21,12 
Individual or family 8 29.029.333.846,20 53,68 5 20.516.692.337,43 86,21 13 49.546.026.183,63 63,62 
Government 2 11.885.829.089,44 21,98 0 0,00 0,00 2 11.885.829.089,44 15,26 
TOTAL 14 54.079.710.040,99 100 6 23.798.197.688,22 100 20 77.877.907.729,21 100 
Source: Author’s calculation based on market capitalization provided by Bovespa for Dec. 19th, 2007 
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TABLE 19 
Composition of Controlling Groups and Largest Shareholders in Level 1 
 
LEVEL 1 (31) 
Companies with controlling shareholders (31) 


























Institutional  0 0,00 0,00 3 48,01 13,89 3 48,01 13,89 
Foreign  1 99,22 38,99 2 75,36 36,85 3 83,31 37,56 
Individual or 
family  
2 76,64 54,69 19 75,60 34,49 21 75,70 36,41 
Government 4 74,56 29,04 0 0 0 4 74,56 29,04 
Companies without controlling shareholders (13) 


























Institutional  1 49,77 49,08 2 65,02 22,27 3 59,93 31,20 
Foreign  0 0 0 1 21,57 11,03 1 21,57 11,03 
Individual or 
family  
1 30,78 18,95 8 51,96 30,81 9 49,61 29,49 
Government 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Companies with and without  controlling shareholders (44) 


























Institutional  1 49,77 49,08 5 58,40 17,24 6 53,97 22,55 
Foreign  1 99,22 38,99 3 57,43 28,24 4 67,88 30,93 
Individual or 
family  
3 61,35 42,78 27 68,60 33,40 30 67,87 34,34 
Government 4 74,56 29,04 0 0 0 4 74,56 29,04 





Composition of Controlling Groups, Largest Shareholders and Market Capitalization in the Level 1 
Market capitalization is reported in R$ millions. 
 
LEVEL 1 
Companies with controlling 
shareholders (31) 
Companies without controlling 
shareholders (13) 
Total Sample (44) 
Shareholder 













Institutional 3 293.689.552.246,58 46,49 3 129.480.474.380,80 52,43 6 423.170.026.627,38 48,16 
Foreign 3 15.675.512.187,34 2,48 1 26.432.048.308,20 10,70 4 42.107.560.495,54 4,79 
Individual or family 21 265.475.374.283,31 42,02 9 91.033.251.818,31 36,86 30 356.508.626.101,62 40,57 
Government 4 56.914.808.603,38 9,01 0 0,00 0,00 4 56.914.808.603,38 6,48 
TOTAL 31 631.755.247.320,61 100 13 246.945.774.507,31 100 44 878.701.021.827,92 100 




Composition of Controlling Groups and Largest Shareholders in the Standard Market 
STANDARD COMPANIES (183) 
Companies with controlling shareholders (133) 


























Institutional  2 95,60 63,25 8 49,91 34,46 10 59,05 40,22 
Foreign  9 76,13 63,30 18 81,97 69,44 27 80,03 67,39 
Individual or 
family  
7 75,55 44,79 71 71,50 45,97 78 71,87 45,86 
Government 11 75,19 63,45 7 68,54 44,79 18 72,61 58,07 
Companies without controlling shareholders (50) 


























Institutional  3 19,66 18,14 0 0 0 3 19,66 18,14 
Foreign  4 40,35 30,07 6 71,79 62,72 10 59,22 49,66 
Individual or 
family  
16 28,78 19,84 21 56,83 37,61 37 44,70 29,93 
Government 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Companies with and without  controlling shareholders (92) 


























Institutional  5 50,04 36,18 8 49,91 34,46 13 49,96 35,12 
Foreign  13 65,13 53,08 24 79,42 67,76 37 74,40 62,60 
Individual or 
family  
23 43,02 27,43 92 68,15 44,06 115 63,13 40,74 
Government 11 75,19 63,45 7 68,54 44,79 18 72,61 38,07 
Source: Annual Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 available in CVM website 
 
TABLE 22 
 Composition of Controlling Groups, Largest Shareholders and Market Capitalization in the 
standard market 
Market capitalization is reported in R$ millions. 
STANDARD 
Companies with controlling 
shareholders (133) 
Companies without controlling 
shareholders (50) 
Total Sample (183) 
Shareholder 













Institutional 10 19.571.494.252,55 2,47 3 1.921.836.112,68 1,48 13 21.493.330.365,23 2,33 
Foreign 27 287.885.347.991,44 36,27 10 73.849.331.727,51 56,94 37 361.734.679.718,95 39,18 
Individual or family 78 37.182.969.910,46 4,69 37 53.922.161.095,74 41,58 115 91.105.131.006,20 9,87 
Government 18 448.989.230.512,91 56,57 0 0,00 0,00 18 448.989.230.512,91 48,63 
TOTAL 133 793.629.042.667,36 100 50 129.693.328.935,93 100 183 923.322.371.603,29 100 




 Mechanisms of Separation Between Control and Ownership in Brazil 
 
ALL COMPANIES (339) 
 Firms with pyramidal 
structure 
 voting capital/total 
capital 
Shareholders 
No of firms percentage No of firms percentage 
Institutional 15            4.42  18 5.31 
Foreign 34 10.03  39 11.50 
Individual or family 173 51.03  148 43.66 
Government 8 2.36  20 5.90 
Total Sample 230 68.84  225 66.37 









TABLE 24: Types of Shareholders’ Agreements 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. Shareholders’ agreements available on the CVM website, visited  between Sept. and  Dec. 
2007. 







































Abyara Planejamento Imobiliário S.A. (NM) 
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Bio. Ol. Veg. S.A. (NM) 
Cia. Concessões Rodoviárias (NM) 
CPFL Energia S.A. (NM) 
CSU Cardsystem (NM) 
EZ TEC Empreendimentos e Participações S.A. (NM) 
Positivo Informática S.A. (NM) 
Redecard S.A. (NM) 
Rodobens Negócios Imobiliários S.A. (NM) 
ALL América Latina Logística S.A. (L 2) 
Marcopolo S.A. (L 2) 
Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A. (L 2) 
Aracruz Celulose S.A. (L 1) 
Banco Industrial e Comercial S.A. (L 1) 
BRADESPAR S.A. (L 1) 





























Açúcar Guarani S.A. (NM) 
Brasil Brokers Participações S.A. (NM) 
Cia. Providência Indústria e Comércio (NM) 
Cyrela Brazil Realty S.A. Empreendimentos e Participações (NM) 
Even Construtora e Incorporadora S.A. (NM) 
Light S.A. (NM) 
Natura Cosméticos S.A. (NM) 
Tempo Participações S.A. (NM) 
Santos-Brasil S.A. (L 2) 
Cia. Fiação Tecidos Cedro Cachoeira (L 1) 
Iochpe-Maxion S.A. (L 1) 























Agra Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A. (NM) 
Odontoprev S.A. (NM) 








Brasilagro – Cia. Brasileira de Propriedades Agrícolas (NM) 
Inpar S.A. (NM) 








02 Indústrias Romi S.A. (NM) 
Banco Bradesco S.A. (L 1) X X   
02 Grendene S.A. (NM) 
Banco Indusval (L 1)   X X 
02 EDP – Energias do Brasil S.A. (NM) 
Itaúsa Investimentos Itaú S.A. (L 1) X  X X 
01 Bolsa de Mercadorias & Futuros – BM&F S.A.  (NM) X    
01 LPS Brasil - Consultoria de Imóveis S.A. (NM) X  X  
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TABLE 25:  Types of Clauses in Shareholders’ agreements that Bind Directors’ Votes  
 




Name of Companies Listing 
Segment 
Brasil Brokers Participações S.A.   NM 
Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A. NM 
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.  NM 
CPFL Energia S.A NM 
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM 
Inpar S.A. NM 
Light S.A. NM 
Medial Saúde S.A.   NM 
Tempo Participações S.A.   NM 
ALL América Latina Logística S.A. L 2 
Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A. L 2 
Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2 





Alienation, leasing, disposal, placement of 
financial burden over goods and rights of the 








Usiminas S.A.   L 1 
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A. NM 
Brasil Brokers Participações S.A.   NM 
Brasilagro-Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A. NM 
CPFL Energia S.A NM 
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM 
Inpar S.A. NM 
Light S.A. NM 
Perdigão S.A. NM 
Tempo Participações S.A.   NM 




Distribution of earnings, dividends, interest 





Usiminas S.A.   L 1 
Brasil Brokers Participações S.A.   NM 
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.  NM 
CSU Cardsystem S.A.  NM 
Light S.A. NM 
Medial Saúde S.A.   NM 
Tempo Participações S.A.   NM 
Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A. L 2 
Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2 




Entering into general contracts within value 
range/maximum term stipulated in the 






Usiminas S.A.   L 1 
Brasil Brokers Participações S.A.   NM 
Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A. NM 
Cia. Providência Ind. Com. NM 
CPFL Energia S.A NM 
Light S.A. NM 
Tempo Participações S.A.   NM 
 
 
Approval of annual, semi annual and 
















 Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A. L 2 
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Santos-Brasil S.A. L 1 






Usiminas S.A.   L 1 
Brasil Brokers Participações S.A.   NM 
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A. NM 
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.  NM 
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM 
Light S.A. NM 
Medial Saúde S.A.   NM 
Tempo Participações S.A.   NM 













Usiminas S.A.   L 1 
Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A. NM 
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.  NM 
CPFL Energia S.A. NM 
Light S.A. NM 
Medial Saúde S.A.   NM 
Perdigão S.A. NM 










Iochpe-Maxion S.A. L 1 
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A. NM 
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM 
Light S.A. NM 
Perdigão S.A. NM 
ALL América Latina Logística S.A. L 2 
 
Liquidation, dissolution, merger, 








 Usiminas S.A.   L 1 
Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A. NM 
Cia. Providência Ind. Com. NM 
CPFL Energia S.A NM 
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM 
Light S.A. NM 
 
 







Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A. L 2 
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A. NM 
Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A. NM 
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM 
Light S.A. NM 
ALL América Latina Logística S.A. L 2 
 
 
Plans of judicial or extra judicial 







Usiminas S.A.   L 1 
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A. NM 
CPFL Energia S.A NM 
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM 
Light S.A. NM 
Perdigão S.A. NM 
 
 
Amortization, redemption or acquisition of 







Tempo Participações S.A.   NM 
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A. NM 
CPFL Energia S.A NM 
Inpar S.A. NM 
Light S.A. NM 
Perdigão S.A. NM 
 





Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2 
Brasil Brokers Participações S.A.   NM 
CPFL Energia S.A. NM  
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM  
Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2 
 
 






Iochpe-Maxion S.A. L 1 
  Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A. NM 
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Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A. NM 
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM 
Light S.A. NM 
 




Usiminas S.A.   L 1 
Brasil Brokers Participações S.A.   NM 
Light S.A. NM 
Medial Saúde S.A.   NM 
Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A. L 2 
 
Transactions between the company and 




Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2 
Brasilagro –Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A. NM 
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.  NM 
Light S.A. NM 
 
Creation of corporate groups (joint ventures, 




Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2 
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.  NM 
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM 
Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A.  L 2 
 
Purchase of new shares by the company 
 
04 
CPFL Energia S.A. NM 
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM 
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.  NM 
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A. NM 
 
Compensation policy and benefits for 
managers and board members 
 
04 
Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A. L 2 
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A. NM 
Cia. Providência Ind. Com. NM 
Tempo Participações S.A.   NM 
 
Determination of the criteria for establishing 
managers’ remuneration  
 
04 
Iochpe-Maxion S.A. L 1 
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM 
Light S.A. NM 
Perdigão S.A. NM 
 




Usiminas S.A.   L 1 
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A. NM 
Light S.A. NM 
Perdigão S.A. NM 
 
Issuance of new classes of shares 
 
04 
Usiminas S.A.   L 1 
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A. NM 
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM 
Light S.A. NM 
 
Reduction of/raising social capital 
 
04 
Usiminas S.A.   L 1 
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.  NM 
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM 
Inpar S.A. NM 
Entering into transactions between the 




Tempo Participações S.A.   NM 
Brasilagro –Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A. NM 
CPFL Energia S.A. NM 
Inpar S.A. NM 
 




Iochpe-Maxion S.A. L 1 
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.  NM 
Light S.A. NM 
 
Changes in accounting policies 
 
03 
Tempo Participações S.A.   NM 
Brasilagro –Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A. NM 
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.  NM 
Creation/ extinction  of controlling companies  
03 
CPFL Energia S.A. NM 
Inpar S.A. NM 
ALL América Latina Logística S.A. L 2 
 
Making other businesses than those related to 




 Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A. L 2 
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM Initiating suits/ arbitration procedures in 




Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A. L 2 
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Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2 
Brasilagro –Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A. NM Creation/liquidation, acquisition and 
alienation of subsidiaries 
 
02 Iochpe-Maxion S.A. L 1 
Brasilagro –Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A. NM Proxy authorization conferred to any person in 
order to decide about any subject that requires 
shareholders’ votes or alienation of assets 
 
02 
Tempo Participações S.A.   NM 
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A. NM Installation/ election of members of the fiscal 
board  
02 
Perdigão S.A. NM 
Medial Saúde S.A.   NM Election of board members  02 
Perdigão S.A. NM 
Tempo Participações S.A.   NM Remuneration of board members  02 
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A. NM 
Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2  
Decision of omitted cases 
 
02 Tempo Participações S.A.   NM 
Brasil Brokers Participações S.A.   NM 
Offering call options or subscription of shares 
to managers, board members, and employees 
of the company  
 
02 
Tempo Participações S.A.   NM 
Changes in the number of managers and board 
members 
01 Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A. NM 
Issuance of non-voting shares or increase in 








Issuance of subscription bonuses 01 CPFL Energia S.A. NM 
Changes in the terms of contracts on 
permission of public services  
01 CPFL Energia S.A NM 
Detailing matters for committee analysis  01 CPFL Energia S.A. NM 
Remuneration of committee members 01 CPFL Energia S.A. NM 
Entering/ altering contracts of personal 
insurance of the CEO or other key manager of 




CSU Cardsystem S.A. 
 
NM 
Hiring consulting service of third parties not 
expressed in the company’s plans  
01 Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A. L 2 








Creation of committees and technical or 
advisory commissions 
01 Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2 
Contracting, altering, breaching shareholders’ 
agreements or any fiduciary business  
01 Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2 
Rules for issuance and cancellation of Units 01 Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2 
Creation of capital reserve for contingencies 
or any kind of operation which may result in a 
reduction of the profits that shall be 










Register of securities offerings or going 
private transactions  
01 Light S.A. NM 







Adoption (and Types) of Poison Pills Clauses by Companies Listed on Novo Mercado,  
Level 2 and Level 1   
  
Threshold Of Poison 
Pills’ Clauses 




Clauses Type A Type B 
Types Of Penalty 
Clauses For Breach 
Of Poison Pills 
1. Abyara Planejamento Imobiliário S.A. Yes - - - - 
2. Açúcar Guarani S.A. Yes - - - - 
3. Agra Empreendimentos Imobiliários 
S.A. 
Yes A  20% - 1 and 2 
4. American Banknote S.A. Yes A and B 20% 10% 1 and 2 
5. Bematech Indústria e Comércio de 
Equipamentos Eletrônicos S.A. 
Yes A 25% - 1 
6. Bolsa de Mercadorias & Futuros S.A. Yes - - - - 
7. Bovespa Holding S.A. Yes A 20%  1 
8. BR Mall Participações S.A. Yes - - - - 
9. Brasil Brokers Participações S.A. Yes A 20% - 1 
10. Brasil Ecodiesel Indústria e Comércio 
de Biocombustíveis e Óleos Vegetais 
S.A. 
Yes A and B 30% 10% 1 and 2 
11. Brasilagro – Companhia Brasileira de 
Propriedades Agrícolas 
Yes A  20% - 1 and 2 
12. Companhia Brasileira 
Desenvolvimento Imobiliário e 
Turístico 
Yes A  35% - 1 
13. Companhia Concessões Rodoviárias Yes - - - - 
14. Companhia Hering Yes A 20% - 1 
15. Companhia Providência Indústria e 
Comécio 
Yes - - - - 
16. Company S.A. Yes A 20% - 1 
17. Construtora Tenda S.A. Yes A  20% - 1 
18. COSAN S.A. Indústria e Comércio Yes - - - - 
19. CPFL Energia S.A. Yes - - - - 
20. CR2 Empreendimentos Imobiliários 
S.A. 
Yes - - - - 
21. Cremer S.A. Yes A 20% - 1 
22. CSU Cardsystem S.A. Yes - - - - 
23. Cyrela Brazil Realty S.A. 
Empreendimentos e Participações 
Yes - - - - 
24. Cyrela Commercial Property S.A. 
Empreendimentos e Participações 
Yes A  15% - 1 and 2 
25. Datasul S.A. Yes A and B 15% 5% 1 and 2 
26. Diagnósticos da América S.A. Yes A 15% - 1 and 2 
27. Drogasil S.A. Yes - - - - 
28. EDP - Energias do Brasil S.A. Yes - - - - 
29. Embraer – Empresa Brasileira de 
Aeronáutica S.A. 
Yes A 35% - 1 
30. Eternit S.A. Yes - - - - 
31. Even Construtora e Incorporadora S.A. Yes A 20% - 1 
32. EZ TEC Empreendimentos e 
Participações S.A. 
Yes A and B 15% 8% 1 and 2 
33. Gafisa S.A. Yes - - - - 
34. Grendene S.A. Yes - - - - 
35. GVT Holding S.A. Yes A and B 15% 9,9% 1 
36. Helbor Empreendimentos S.A. Yes A 20% - 1 and 2 
37. Indústrias Romi S.A. Yes A 15% - 1 and 2 
38. Inpar S.A. Yes A and B 20% 10% 1 and 2 
39. Klabin Segall S.A. Yes A and B 15% 5% 1 and 2 
40. Light S.A. Yes - - - - 
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41. Localiza Rent a Car S.A. Yes B - 10% 1 
42. Log-In Logística Intermodal S.A. Yes A 35% - 1 and 2 
43. Lojas Renner S.A. Yes A 20% - 1 and 2 
44. LPS Consultoria de Imóveis S.A. Yes A and B 20% 8% 1 and 2 
45. Lupatech S.A. Yes A 20% - 1 
46. Medial Saúde S.A. Yes A 20% - 1 
47. Metalfrio Solutions S.A. Yes - - - - 
48. MRV Engenharia S.A. Yes B - 10% 1 
49. Natura Cosméticos S.A. Yes A and B 15% 30% 1 
50. Odontoprev S.A. Yes A 15% - 1 and 2 
51. PDG Realty Empreendimentos e 
Participações S.A. 
Yes - - - - 
52. Perdigão S.A. Yes A 20% - 1 and 2 
53. Porto Seguro S.A. Yes B - 10% 1 
54. Positivo Informática S.A. Yes A 10% - 1 and 2 
55. Profarma Distribuidora de Produtos 
Farmacêuticos S.A. 
Yes A and B 20% 10% 1 and 2 
56. Redecard S.A. Yes A 26% - 1 
57. Renar Maçãs S.A. Yes - - - - 
58. Rodobens Negócios Imobiliários S.A. Yes A and B 15% 5% 1 and 2 
59. Rossi Residencial S.A. Yes B - 15% 1 
60. São Carlos Empreendimentos e 
Participações S.A. 
Yes A 25% - 1 
61. São Martinho S.A. Yes A 10% - 1 
62. SLC Agrícola S.A. Yes A 20% - 1 
63. Tegma Gestão Logística S.A. Yes - - - - 
64. Tempo Participações S.A. Yes A 20% - 1 
65. Totvs S.A. Yes A and B 20% 8% 1 and 2 
Super Tag-
along 
Threshold Of Poison 
Pills’ Clauses 




Clauses Type A Type B 
Types Of Penalty 
Clauses For Breach 
Of Poison Pills 
66. ALL América Latina Logística S.A. - - - - - 
67. Kroton Educacional S.A. Yes A 15% - 1 
68. Marcopolo S.A. Yes - - - - 
69. Multiplan S.A. Yes A 20% - 1 and 2 
70. Santos-Brasil S.A. Yes A 20% - 1 
71. Saraiva S.A. Yes - - - - 
Threshold Of Poison 
Pills’ Clauses 




Clauses Type A Type B 
Types Of Penalty 
Clauses For Breach 
Of Poison Pills 
72. Aracruz Celulose S.A. - - - - - 
73. Banco Bradesco S.A. - - - - - 
74. Banco Industrial e Comercial S.A. Yes - - - - 
75. Banco Indusval S.A. Yes - - - - 
76. Banco Panamericano S.A. Yes - - - - 
77. BRADESPAR S.A. - - - - - 
78. Companhia de Fiação e Tecidos Cedro 
e Cachoeira 
- - - - - 
79. Iochpe-Maxion S.A. - - - - - 
80. Itaúsa Investimentos Itaú S.A. - - - - - 
81. Metalúrgica Gerdau S.A. - - - - - 
82. Paranapanema S.A. Yes - - - - 
83. Sadia S.A. - - - - - 
84. Usinas Siderúrgicas de Minas Gerais 
S.A. 
- - - - - 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the Bylaws of eighty-four companies available on the CVM website. Bylaws 
available in the Annual Information Reports referring to year-end 2006, visited between Sept. 2007 and Dec. 2007. 
 
